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Abstract 
It is widely recognised that Russia’s foreign policy has become increasingly aggressive 
for the past decades, whereas the Crimean annexation in 2014 has been perceived 
especially alarming in the European security context. This study examines and compares 
the Finnish and Swedish parliamentary debate in order to determine how the mainstream 
political circles have reacted to the deteriorated security environment in the two non-
aligned states. By using qualitative content analysis, this study reviews three debates of 
both countries conducted between 2015-2020, while scrutinising the following topics: 
NATO membership, military cooperation and national military capabilities. 
The findings indicate that, in general, threat perception has increased among the political 
elite of both states, which has found reflection in their altered security policy preferences. 
The majority of both parliaments favoured enhancing international military cooperation, 
supported measures to strengthen the country’s national military capabilities, and some 
political actors changed their position vis-à-vis NATO membership. Regarding the latter, 
the Swedish debate turned out to be more sophisticated and detailed, and there is an 
increasingly higher understanding in the parliament that Sweden should opt for 
membership in the Alliance. However, the membership question has also intensified in 
the Finnish debate but without significant position changes among the parties.  
This study concludes that threat perception has witnessed a greater increase in Sweden, 
which was confirmed with the more concrete and rapid responses to the changed security 
environment by the Swedish political actors. Secondly, in general terms, both states are 
gradually drifting away from their old, constructed identity of non-alignment which has 
previously been a central element of these states’ security thinking. 
Keywords: Finland; Sweden; non-alignment; security environment; threat perception; 
NATO membership; military cooperation; national military capabilities 
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Introduction 
Joint assessment of the Finnish and Swedish security politics has been a subject of 
academic inquiries for years (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2001; Michel, 2011; Ojanen 2000; 
Rusi, 2016). These two Nordic states pose an interesting security phenomenon that dates 
to the Cold War era when both countries upheld non-alignment in a polarised Europe. 
Sweden and Finland have stayed non-aligned ever since and are often examined together 
because of favourable methodological conditions. Apart from being neighbours, these 
countries share various features, e.g., culture, history, and also the geographical location 
between the core of Europe and Russia. Despite various similarities, the Swedish and 
Finnish doctrines of non-alignment are different in origin, but the roots of non-alignment 
keep influencing their political decision-making even today. One reason for this is that 
neutrality is still strongly reflected in the historically constructed identities of these states. 
Credible non-alignment and neutrality have also required military capabilities, and both 
countries have invested substantial resources into territorial defence, especially during 
the Cold War. However, with the end of the Cold War, it seemed that deep confrontation 
and military threat had permanently vanished, a belief, which illustrated especially the 
development of Swedish defence policies. Military capabilities which were once 
considered significant for its size were dwindled remarkably and the Swedish military 
found new implementation, predominantly related to peacekeeping operations (Ojanen, 
2016, p. 141). Finland, on the other hand, did not rush to alter its defence policies and has 
kept its military capabilities up to date, which can arguably be a more thoughtful choice 
retrospectively speaking. 
As soon as Russia was recovering from the confusion and weakness caused by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the turbulences in the 1990s, it started to become evident 
that Moscow seeks to restore its power-based influence, especially in its near-abroad. The 
events of Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014) demonstrated that Russia does not hesitate 
to use military force against other sovereign states to achieve its foreign political goals, 
whereas the aggression vis-à-vis Ukraine was perceived especially alarming in the 
European security context, including in Finland and Sweden (Finnish Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2016; Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service, 2019). Hence, the 
European security situation witnessed significant deterioration due to Russia’s behaviour
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and forced the surrounding actors to adapt. Because Finland and Sweden are unallied, the 
security problématique of these states evolves around the question of how the non-aligned 
actors have reacted to the changed security conditions.  
Research puzzle, aim and questions 
In spite of the changed security situation, the paradox is that leaders of both states have 
remained loyal to the principle of non-alignment, even though the events of Crimea have 
altered public opinion and made the countries to seek deeper partnership with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). For instance, the opinion polls indicate that 
support for NATO membership increased in Finland from 17% in 2013 to 26% in 2014, 
and in Sweden from 31% in 2013 to 40% in 2014 (Orjala, 2017; Thurfjell, 2014; 
Semneby, 2014). In addition, Finland and Sweden have gradually become one of the 
closest partner-states of NATO and practice substantial cooperation (Wieslander, 2019). 
Hence, the purpose of this research is to find out how has deteriorated security 
environment in Europe changed threat perception among the Finnish and Swedish 
mainstream political circles, while having the focus on their altered security policy 
preferences. 
There are many ways to study this puzzle and public opinion is one indicator of the 
internal domain which witnessed change in security policy preferences. However, public 
opinion remains insufficient in reflecting the deeper reasoning behind different 
sentiments. Therefore, this study approaches this topic by focusing on the countries’ 
political elite, i.e., parliamentary parties, whereas such parties represent different 
segments of the society. Moreover, parties as entities have often more elaborated 
standpoints on issues like security politics and they can have a strong influence in forming 
the policy preferences of their supporters (Slothuus, 2010). Hence, parties as such are 
well observable and examining political actors enables to grasp the domestic insight on 
security in a more comprehensive manner. 
To conduct the study, this research compares and contrasts the parliamentary debate on 
security between Sweden and Finland by observing three security-related debates of both 
countries within 2015-2020: NATO membership, military cooperation and national 
military capabilities. The debates will be examined with the help of qualitative content 
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analysis (QCA), indicating that this study guides from an interpretivist approach to work 
with the empirical material.  
By handling the data in an above-mentioned way, the results of this work will 
automatically provide a two-level analysis, even though the general focus of the chosen 
research design is on cross-national analysis. Firstly, this research sheds light on how the 
discourse on security has changed in the Finnish and Swedish parliaments by exploring 
different standpoints among the parties in both states (intra-state level analysis), and 
secondly if any similarities between the two states can be detected with regard to the 
discourse change (cross-national level analysis).  
In order to meet the objectives of this study, the research guides from the following 
research question:  how does deteriorated security environment affect the political elite’s 
security policy preferences in a small non-aligned state? The main research question will 
be answered with the help of two sub-questions: how does threat perception change as a 
result of deteriorated security environment; what changes does altered threat perception 
evoke in security policy preferences? 
The assumption is that a deteriorated security environment makes domestic actors, such 
as the political parties, critically reflect upon the current security situation which 
accordingly finds translation in an increased level of threat perception. Derived from this, 
increased threat perception is expected to initiate change in security policy preferences. 
It should also be noted that this research departs from the constructivist paradigm and 
acknowledges that security is socially constructed and may be perceived differently 
among domestic actors. Hence, while it is anticipated that there exist diverse opinions, 
this study aims to grasp the general trends of the debates. 
Research structure 
The first part of the thesis focuses on the theoretical aspects of the study by introducing 
security and threat perception. These concepts will be elaborated and discussed from the 
viewpoint of different schools of thought, and finally reviewed through the prism of 




The second part of the work starts with the historical background by exploring what has 
essentially led to the non-alignment for Finland and Sweden, and then continues with 
providing an overview of the contemporary security politics of both countries. In the case 
of Sweden, the focus will primarily be on the dilemma of an interest-based and ideas-
based approach to security. In the case of Finland, the central topic will be Finlandisation 
and its impact on the Finnish security politics.  
The third part introduces the methodological aspects of the work, where research design, 
the exact method for analysis and some data-specific details will be presented. 
The following section presents the empirical data of the three debates of both parliaments 
on three pre-determined topics. A state-level analysis will follow each parliamentary 
debate. After the intra-state analysis, the study continues with contrasting and comparing 
the states' security debate, which will be the paramount part of the analysis. The research 
ends with a conclusion, which includes an overview of the results and suggests additional 
topics for prospective research in the light of the findings.  
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1 Conceptualising security and threat perception 
The purpose of this chapter is to position this research in the academic realm in order to 
provide a correct meaning of how the central concepts of security and threat perception 
are approached. This chapter begins with presenting the debate between the traditionalist 
and wideners’ approach to security and then proceeds with explaining security through 
the constructivist prism, which was found the most suitable approach on security as per 
the objectives of this study. The second part of the chapter focuses on threat perception, 
where the concept is elaborated and discussed from different paradigms accordingly. This 
chapter ends with a short paragraph on the expected relationship between the concepts. 
1.1 Security  
Even though security might sound like a self-explanatory concept, it usually remains 
unproblematic until it is taken under greater scrutiny (Booth, 2007). Indeed, it is no 
surprise that there exist multiple interpretations and understanding over the nature of 
security among different theoretical traditions. The most notable academic inquiries of 
security have developed around the questions of the referent object (security for who) and 
security from what (what is the threat). For example, depending on the tradition, the main 
actor of security might be an individual or the state. Of course, there are other matters to 
consider when conceptualising security, such as, is it something that can be measured? 
Baldwin (1997) gives an example of General Jacob L. Devers, who believed that security 
could not vary in degree, i.e., you are either secure or insecure, and there cannot be any 
halfway (Baldwin, 1997, p. 14). Buzan et al. (1998) agree and suggest that trying to 
measure security as a matter of degree can be problematic as the word itself indicates 
something absolute (Buzan et al., 1998).  
One can also think about the importance or necessity to discuss security; in other words, 
what makes security important? According to Baldwin, security is a crucial prerequisite 
for other life values such as peace and freedom (Baldwin, 1997, p. 18). Therefore, some 
academic traditions, such as neorealism and realism, which place the state in the centre, 
tend to argue that security is the ultimate value that each state should pursue (Baldwin, 
1997, p. 21). However, there are alternative views, for instance, constructivism, that 
challenge this state-centrism and are eager to broaden the scope of security in relation to 
its subject(s) and the field of applicability.  
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It turns out that there is no consensus in the academic realm on what does security actually 
stand for. Conversely, there exists a debate between two major camps around the meaning 
of security (Buzan et al., 1998). However, even though security has initiated debate 
among different academic realms, three fundamental layers of security can be determined 
which are more or less agreed upon among the scholars of different tradition: the presence 
of a referent object (security for who); the existence of a real of possible danger (security 
of what); the desire to mitigate or escape the danger (Booth, 2007, p. 100). The following 
section presents the central debate about security, where on the one side, there are 
traditionalists who state that security should remain orthodox and be included only in the 
military analysis. On the other hand, there are the so-called wideners who argue that due 
to the overall development and interwovenness of the world, security encompasses far 
more areas than the military domain, and therefore security cannot be only seen from a 
state-centric view. 
1.1.1 The traditionalists  
Security has traditionally been associated with the realist school of thought, and literature 
in this field can at least be traced back to the classical article of Wolfers (1952) ’”National 
Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol’ where security is understood as states' physical 
power to protect its values and interests (Wolfers, 1952). In more specific, Wolfers talks 
about security as an acquired value. He argues that “nation is secure to the extent to which 
it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, 
if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.” (Wolfers, 1952, p. 484) and 
continues, “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired 
values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” 
(Wolfers, 1952, p. 484). Hence, being ‘secure’ is in correlation with the ability to deter 
and defeat a danger if needed for the sake of protecting one’s way of life, order and norms, 
understood as values. In other words, the traditionalist account on security is about 
survival of the state.  
Derived from that, Walt (1991) suggests that security studies should primarily concentrate 
on the topic of military force (Walt, 1991). “Security studies assume that conflict between 
states is always a possibility and that the use of military force has far-reaching effects on 
states and societies.” (Walt, 1991, p. 212). Thus, traditionalists believe that protection of 
the absorbed values by the military form the core of security. As traditionalists place the 
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state in the middle and the military indeed can be used to measure states' capability to 
deter and escape their threats, it seems understandable why traditionalists wish to stick to 
the military domain while discussing security.  
Therefore, it is no surprise that traditionalists are not excited about expanding the concept. 
Walt expressed his concern that if the concept of security becomes too vague and 
incorporates issues such as pollution, diseases, and economic recessions, it would harm 
the ‘intellectual coherence’ of the security studies and make the concept meaningless 
(Walt, 1991, p. 213). Hence, the key argument of the traditionalists against broadening 
the concept is that by deviating from the state-centrism and military focus of security, the 
concept will eventually lose its meaning and become void (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 3). On 
the other hand, traditionalists are aware of the broader tendency regarding the pressure to 
widen the concept. This means that some traditionalists are, to some extent, ready to admit 
that there might be a need to broaden the scope in the search of looking for non-military 
causes in conflicts, but they reassert that the domain of military is of paramount 
importance in the security studies (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 3).  
Although this study considers military domain as an essential part of Finnish and Swedish 
security, the traditional thinking of security remains short in explaining the origin of 
security interests, specifically when it comes to understanding the different internal 
factors making up the security interests within Finland and Sweden. Therefore, additional 
explanations of security will be introduced. 
1.1.2 The ‘wideners’ 
Since the 1980s, the political and academic discourse of security has experienced a wave 
of change due to the ‘new security challenges’ that have emerged into the international 
arena (Stritze & Vuori, 2016). Stritze & Vuori claim that the wars in the Balkans, ethnic 
conflicts in Africa and regional security dynamics in the Middle East have proved that 
security has encompassed several domestic factors to be considered with (Stritze & Vuori, 
2016, p. 51).  
One of the first such critics, Ullmann (1983), argued that there was a need to widen the 
scope of security from its traditional realm of military force because focusing merely on 
the military aspect of security would leave a false image of reality (Ullman, 1983). First 
of all, it causes states to focus only on military threats, which leaves other areas (the new 
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sources of threats) blank and secondly, he claimed, that the general militarisation would 
only harm the international relations in the long run and make it increasingly insecure 
(Ullman, 1983).  
Mathews (1989) also emphasised the need to reconsider what constitutes security. He 
believes that in addition to the economic domain, there is a need to include even sectors 
such as the environment, resources and demographic situation into security issues 
(Mathews, 1989). Mathews argues that thanks to the overall development of 
communication, labour movement, and trade, i.e., globalisation, the previous assumptions 
and institutions are insufficient to tackle the problems of the changing world (Mathews, 
1989). Hence, the understanding of what can be considered a security issue must broaden 
from the military domain as the tendencies of our planet cannot be separated by artificial 
borders created by humans. 
Hence, new opinions emerged claiming that the ‘new security challenges’ extend beyond 
the traditional military domain, thereby challenging the orthodox stand on security and 
state-centrism and arguing for an expansion of the scope of security studies because of 
the changing nature of threats, as they have become increasingly non-military (Booth, 
1994; Buzan et al., 1998; Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2007; Mathews, 1989; Smith 1999; 
Ullmann, 1983). This critique has evolved into different branches of criticism, whereas 
Critical Security Studies (CSS) and the Copenhagen School have stood out most 
prominently.  
The Copenhagen School departs from an understanding that security is closely related to 
survival regardless of the object (state, society, party, and et cetera) and see security more 
as an act (Diskaya, 2013). The act of security is about claiming something as a matter of 
security which enables actors to undertake (sometimes extreme) measures to counter the 
danger, meaning that an issue is taken above the regular politics by using special tools 
(Buzan et al., 1998). In other words, security is about mobilisation of political attention 
to highlight an issue that is considered paramount. To grasp the phenomenon better, 
Buzan et al. have labelled this act as securitisation, which can be seen as a more extreme 
version of politicisation.  
In more concrete terms, securitisation is about how an actor presents an issue as a threat 
and how this presentation is perceived by the audience (Diskaya, 2013). An issue is 
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successfully securitised when it is first labelled as a security issue by the securitiser and, 
secondly, accepted by the public as such (Diskaya, 2013). Thus, the Copenhagen School’s 
security approach is primarily interested in how a speech act constructs security and the 
broader implications of this move, regardless of the topic. However, this research does 
not scrutinise speeches for the sake of deconstructing security in the search of danger, and 
the approach of the Copenhagen School is therefore not practical as per the objectives of 
this study.  
CSS is closely related to the Critical Theory of international relations and has its roots in 
Marxist ideology (Diskaya, 2013). Despite being a diverse approach, Browning & 
McDonald (2013) note that the core of CSS is based on two major concerns, the political 
and ethical implications of security. The political implications are related to what kind of 
political responses does security evoke and how security is used to legitimate the roles of 
certain actors (Browning & McDonald, 2013, p. 237). The second point concerns ethical 
issues and is mainly about the winners and losers of security practises, whereas the focus 
of security in this regard is on human emancipation (Browning & McDonald, 2013, pp. 
237-238; Diskaya, 2013). As this study does not examine the effect of security on 
different actors but instead concentrates on the more structural aspects of it, such as the 
internal sources of security's construction in Finland and Sweden, the CSS is incompatible 
with the general approach to the topic. 
The current overview of the academic literature reveals that the concept of security has 
indeed broadened and included several new domains, including non-military ones. As a 
result, not only have these new tendencies initiate a pressure to deepen and expand the 
concept of security, but they have also eroded the previous demarcation of intra-state and 
international security questions (Stritzel & Vuori, 2016, pp. 50-51). Booth argues that 
broadening the concept has been an inevitable consequence of the security studies, as its 
supreme goal is to provide a greater understanding of security itself that can be achieved 
by understanding the multidimensionality of today's world (Booth, 1994). At the same 
time, neither does the recently developed critique try to prove that military and war are 
not necessary for the security studies, but instead break the exclusive subject (the state) 
and focus (the military domain) of it (Booth, 1994). 
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However, not all scholars agree that this deliberation has been fruitful. Baldwin argues 
that despite the new ideas and fields of security in recent years, it is just the different 
colours of the same topic (Baldwin, 1997, p. 23). Hence, the increasingly 
multidimensional spectrum of security has still the same basics as brought up by Wolfers 
already in 1952 and that the current matters (the new security challenges) can be 
accommodated into the same old framework (Baldwin, 1997, p. 23). Baldwin remains 
thus critical towards scholars who try to present the broadened range of security’s 
applicability as something revolutionary, claiming that “redefining ‘security’ has recently 
become something of a cottage industry.” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5). He adds that one should 
instead gain a better understanding of the word itself, not on its applicability, “relatively 
little attention is devoted to conceptual issues as such.” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5).  
Baldwin, therefore, argues that security is a neglected rather than a contested concept. 
The recent works (including the debate between the traditionalists and wideners) have not 
entailed any progress in terms of providing a deeper conceptual analysis of security 
(Baldwin, 1997). Similarly to Baldwin, Booth does not think that the core elements of 
security are contested, but “when it comes to world politics this core is then encased in 
layers of meaning that derive from different political theories, and that these are 
contested according to the ebb and flow of political theories, and the rise and fall of 
international political systemic paradigms.” (Booth, 2007, p. 100). Hence, while some 
of the basic arguments about security are accepted on different sides of the debate, it 
seems that in the end it is up to the ontological positioning of the researcher that defines 
how one sees security. 
Taken together, even though there are aspects among the critical approaches to security 
that match with the objectives of this study, they still do not provide the necessary tools 
to comprehend security as for the needs of this research. The Copenhagen School’s 
approach remains too attached to the speech act as such, and CSS’s approach concentrates 
too much on the subject of the political speech. Therefore, this study opted for 
conventional constructivism instead. While staying on the same ontological ground with 
CSS and the Copenhagen School, the focus of this research is slightly different and suits 
better with more of a conventional type of constructivism. The biggest difference among 
the conventional and critical constructivist approach to security, for example, in terms of 
identity, is that conventional approach uses identity in an explanatory manner to explain 
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security-related phenomena, while critical approach generally takes identity as a starting-
point in order to grasp securities and insecurities (Cho, 2009). 
1.1.3 Security and constructivism 
As a result of the debate around the concept, security has expanded for the past 40 years 
and incorporated additional fields, especially by those scholars who represent the non-
traditional literature. Also, the meaning and importance of security might depend on the 
angle of approach. As this study employs constructivist means in studying deteriorated 
security environment and threat perception in Finland and Sweden, the following section 
provides an outlook on the constructivist stand on security.  
As what is inherent for other new approaches to security, constructivists are also critical 
towards state-centrism and argue that both international and domestic factors have a vital 
role to play when speaking about security (Smith, 1999). Constructivists highlight that 
“security communities are path-dependent and socially constructed” (Smith, 1999, p. 
87), which implies that security is something constructed, it is dependent on what 
different actors make of it (Smith, 1999). Farrell (2002) provides a solid explanation 
between the differences of realist and constructivist approaches to security: “What 
matters most for realists is the material structure of world politics. States do what they 
have the power to do. For constructivists, states do what they think most appropriate.” 
(Farrell, 2002 p. 52). Thus, as generally with constructivism, it remains unconstrained 
with its explanations regarding security and allows us to interpret security as dependent 
on values, norms and identities, in addition to the imperative feature of power as it is in 
the traditional realm.  
Constructivists also fill the gap that remains unnoticed for realists regarding state 
interests, their origin and essence (Farrell, 2002). In more specific, Karacasulu & Uzgören 
list several points that can be seen as a constructivist contribution to security studies. 
According to them constructivists acknowledge that actors may act as role-players who 
do not act to maximise their utility from a rational point of view (Karacasulu & Uzgören, 
2007, p. 37). Instead, actors derive from the ‘logic of appropriates’ and act how they 
perceive appropriate (Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2007, p. 37). And secondly, constructivists 
comprehend that actors’ interest and identities are not fixed but subject to change which 
takes place during the interaction with other actors (Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2007, p. 38). 
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Hence, interests and identities of actors are socially constructed, which can even be 
applied to the nature of international relations – actors’ interest and roles are subject to 
change in time. 
With a real-life example, Schimmelfennig (1998) provides a constructivist explanation of 
NATO enlargement after the Cold War. He argues that this enlargement was based on 
international socialisation, whereas socialisation stands for the internalisation of the 
common norms and values (Schimmelfennig, 1998). After restoring their sovereignty, the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) states pursued to join NATO as they were willing 
to embrace the community values and norms of the West, which resulted from 
identification with the West. On the other hand, NATO acted value-rationally by 
accepting these post-communist states, as it was willing to promote liberal values, peace, 
and multilateralism with the CEE states (Schimmelfennig, 1998, p. 230). Hence, it can be 
argued that states and (state)-interests are still valid while talking about security, but the 
constructivist approach to security allows us to include additional spheres to explain 
states’ action, including norms, values, and identity.  
To conclude, as this research is merely interested what are the different internal factors 
behind the security debate (such as history, identities, and other different subjective 
interpretations), this study benefits from the constructivist paradigm best to examine what 
changes have taken place in the security debate of Sweden and Finland. The following 
paragraph elaborates the meaning of security environment. 
Security environment has a central importance in this study, and it should be briefly 
explained what is meant by this conception in this research. Security environment as 
understood here refers to a single security space as perceived by the political elite, with 
additional sub-factors such as alignment and non-alignment (Iso-Markku et al., 2018). 
Hence, even though security environment is based on the authorities’ perception of the 
surrounding space, security environment inevitably includes a geographical element 
within it. For example, Sweden perceives the Baltic Sea region (including the bordering 
countries) as a direct part of its security environment, whereas a conflict in the Baltic 
states would not leave Sweden unaffected (Iso-Markku et al., 2018, p. 34). Hence, while 
the central factor of security environment is the relationship between the decision-makers 
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and their perception of the surroundings, security environment also contains different sub-
dimensions with a political, military and geographical character. 
1.2 Threat perception 
There are multiple ways to approach threat perception in international relation while 
staying within the constructivist paradigm. One of these approaches guides from 
psychological reasoning and seeks to trace the relationship between the decision-making 
patterns and cognitive perception and misperception of reality (Jervis, 1976). However, 
the problematique of this paper concerns the influence of a changed security situation on 
domestic actors in non-aligned states. Because of this, this paper concentrates on how 
threat perception has altered political actors’ security policy preferences. Thus, in order 
to provide a deeper understanding of the concept as applied in this paper, the concept will 
be first divided into threat and perception.  
There are usually two types of threats to be distinguished, verbal and physical. Verbal 
threats are usually conducted through communication where threatening is used to 
achieve a wished outcome by the threatener (Stein, 2013). On the other hand, physical 
threats indicate some physical signal or move, for instance, the accumulation of military 
power or economic sanctions to persuade the weaker side to comply with the will of the 
threatener (Stein, 2013, p. 2). By perception, it can be indicated that threats do have a 
referent object which the threats are targeting. This means that these threats are perceived 
by someone or something in the process of perception, which is “the process of 
apprehending by means of the senses and recognising and interpreting what is processed” 
(Stein, 2013, p. 2). In other words, threat perception is the ability to process and analyse 
information coming from the surrounding environment while filtering out what might 
constitute a threat.  
As argued previously, the constructivist account does not inherently reject explanations 
from realists. Instead, they try to add some elements which realists do not cover. The 
same goes for the concept of threat perception. Therefore, it might be useful to briefly 
look at the realist stand on threat perception. Farnham (2003) brings out that for realists, 
the condition of posing a threat is fulfilled when there exists capability. This means that 
according to realists, states who are capable of harming (by having the militaristic or 
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economic capabilities) will use it and implying that weaker states are often seeing more 
powerful actors as threatening (Farnham, 2003). 
Additionally, threat perception is related to the balance of threat as suggested by Walt 
(1985), according to which states who perceive themselves threatened change their 
alliance behaviour (Walt, 1985, pp. 12-13). Walt lists multiple scenarios which might 
push states to seek balance to the perceived threat. Among others, Walt argues that 
offensive intention materialised as aggressive behaviour might evoke counteraction from 
other states (Walt, 1985, pp. 12-13). Also, threat perception is usually seen as a 
connecting feature of action and reaction in the situation of a crisis (Cohen, 1978). This 
indicates that there is often an event that initiates increased threat perception by other 
actors. Here, this work sees Russia’s aggressive foreign policy as an impulse for Sweden 
and Finland to balance against the new perceived threat. 
Constructivists, on the other hand, see threat perception as something socially constructed 
with a different level of analysis for it – individual, group or state (Stein, 2013, p. 43). 
According to constructivists, threat perception emerges as a result of synthesis within the 
public discussion between politicians, experts and the wider public, while each group uses 
their unique way to observe and detect the threat (Meyer, 2009). This suggests that threat 
perception emerges and evolves in the mixture of different domestic factors. Furthermore, 
there seems to be a correlation between the social structures of a state and the perception 
of threat. “Domestic society and its accompanying identities influence how a state's 
decision makers perceive threat” (Stein, 2013, p. 7). This has also been stressed by 
Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero (2007) who argue that under certain conditions, identity 
can dominate over the objective balance of power, meaning on some occasions sticking 
to a certain identity outweighs the perception of threat (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 
2007). Hence, according to constructivist, actors do not necessarily perceive threats 
‘objectively’. Instead, they guide by their own beliefs and understandings, influenced by 
their identity. 
The constructivist approach also pays attention to agreed rules and norms of regulating 
life, which means threat perception as such is directly linked to the common norms and 
rules (Cohen, 1978). Cohen believes that once the common rules, such as the international 
law, has been violated by a state, it signals to the other actors that threat from this 
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particular state may be anticipated (Cohen, 1978). But as threats are probabilistic or 
theoretical, meaning that their realisation can either happen or stay hypothetical it is up 
to the actor whether to consider the perceived threats or not (Rousseau & Garcia-
Retamero, 2007, p. 745). By the same token, change in threat perception might evoke 
changes in identity, because as argued earlier, constructivist do not see actors' identities 
as fixed but rather subject to change. 
A parallel can be brought up with the examples of Finland and Sweden, who had a strong 
attachment to neutrality during the Cold War but became members of the European Union 
(EU) and have advocated military non-alignment ever since (Möller & Bjereld, 2010). 
Moreover, since Russia’s ambition is to make a return as a great power, Finland and 
Sweden have gradually approached NATO, hinting that there are additional identity-
related changes taking place. Hence, the threat perception of Finland and Sweden has 
changed due to Russia’s increased aggressiveness, meaning that both countries are willing 
to make changes to mitigate the impact of the changing nature of the security 
environment. At the same time, threat perception is socially constructed, and different 
domestic actors within these states might have a different interpretation of the threat and 
how to perceive it, meaning that certain parties do not necessarily perceive changed 
security situation similarly and/or do not support similar measures to deal with the 
increased threat. 
1.3 Ontological and epistemological considerations 
Leaning on constructivism matches also with the interpretivist epistemology of the work. 
This study is not merely interested in states as actors (seen as the paramount actor among 
realists), but rather in the internal dynamics of decision-makers (subjective) reflection on 
security and threat perception. Constructivist approach also fits the fact that the two 
countries have historically embodied different constructed identities over time – in the 
case of Sweden, there is a traditional belief in non-alignment, which has been embraced 
in the society throughout the centuries. Regarding Finland, there is the phenomenon of 
Finlandisation and a strong understanding of state’s ability to defend itself in a case of a 
conflict, which both are/have been strong constructions of the Finnish identity.  
To conclude, it can be concisely reflected on how the concepts of security and threat 
perception are expected to relate to each other. Contrary to positivistic causality, this 
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paper does not anticipate any specific causal mechanism between security and threat 
perception per se. It is rather assumed that change in the security environment caused by 
the Russian aggression against Ukraine has initiated a change of the security debate in 
Finland and Sweden. Derived from this, this work’s theoretical puzzle is related to how 
deteriorated security environment affect threat perception of domestic actors in non-
aligned small states. Answer to this question will be yielded by the empirical examination 
of the security debates in Finland and Sweden. 
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2 Overview of the Finnish and Swedish security politics 
Understanding non-alignment in the European security architecture after the 
Second World War 
When it comes to security arrangements in Europe after the Second World War, non-
alignment and neutrality could be the main keywords characterising the security politics 
of Sweden and Finland. As known, both countries decided to stay out of the military 
alliance, NATO, after its formation in 1949, whereas both had their reasons to stay out of 
the Alliance. However, a closer look on the map reveals that Sweden and Finland were 
not the only ones that remained non-aligned during the Cold War. Apart from Sweden 
and Finland, there are additional ‘grey spots’ in the security map of Europe. Even today, 
Austria, Ireland and Switzerland, whom all would have the possibility to make a decision 
and join NATO, have decided not to opt for that. 
Cottey (2013) argues that despite the differences behind the countries’ reasoning to non-
alignment as mentioned above, neutrality has become deeply rooted in the countries’ 
domestic policies and national identity. Moreover, it can be said that non-alignment has 
developed into a sort of institution which therefore makes non-alignment hard to change, 
even after the end of the Cold War (Cottey, 2013). As this study is focusing on the Finnish 
and Swedish security debates, the following section takes a closer look at the individual 
reasoning and explanations behind the non-alignment of these two states. 
2.1 Finland and the roots of the current security policies 
2.1.1 Neutrality and Finlandisation  
Finnish security thinking cannot be separated from the presence of its big neighbour 
Russia, since the two countries share a border of more than 1300km. Even though some 
roots in this relationship can be traced back to the era of the Russian Empire, the 
contemporary security dynamics are most meaningful when departing from the aftermath 
of the Second World War. As known from history, Finland fought two wars with the 
Soviet Union, and after a loss in the Continuation War, it lost over 10% of its territory, it 
had to agree with the Soviet naval base in Porkkala and was forced to carry a heavy burden 
in war indemnities (Tiilikainen, 2006, p. 76). In addition, Finland was later on in a 
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position where it was forced to sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance (FCMA1) with the Soviet Union in 1948 (Forsberg, 2018, p. 3). 
This treaty asserted Finland’s commitment to neutrality, assured to deter any attempt to 
use Finnish soil to attach the Soviet Union by foreign states, and included the possibility 
to ask military aid from the Soviet Union if needed to fulfil the treaty (Forsberg, 2018, p. 
3). Even though the treaty can be regarded as vague in its wording and it did not enforce 
any major commitments to its parties, this treaty is seen as a symbolic indication of the 
Finnish will to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union in exchange for keeping its 
sovereignty (Rusi, 2016, pp. 33-35). Hence, good relations with the Soviet Union were 
something that the political elite needed to reckon with. The leaders and the nation 
absorbed these principles, and this Finnish political practice has been labelled as 
Finlandisation. 
Finlandisation, also known as the Kekkonen-Paasikivi line2, describes the relationship 
between Finland and the Soviet Union, where the latter made Finland to abide by its 
preferred foreign policy track, while enabling Finland to stick to formal sovereignty. In 
order to please Moscow, Finland had to conduct its foreign and security politics in a way 
which would, first of all, be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and secondly, would not leave 
any suspicion that the Finnish soil could be used in attacking the Soviet Union (Forsberg 
& Vaahtoranta, 2001, p. 85). Hence, the Kekkonen-Paasikivi line was based on the 
assumption that Finland should avoid substantial integration with the West, and even 
more firmly preclude itself from the West’s military alliances such as NATO.  
In addition, thanks to the arrangements with the Soviet Union, Finland did not criticise 
the Soviet Union, even during the events in Hungary (1956) and Prague (1968) (Forsberg, 
2018, p. 4). However, the same policy worked the other way around too, meaning that 
Finland refrained from condemning the United States (US) for its invasion in Vietnam, 
thereby attempting to truly hold a balance on its neutrality policy (Forsberg & 
Vaahtoranta, 2001, p. 70). Taken together, Finlandisation meant that Finland was firmly 
attached to the concept of neutrality which was absorbed into the Finnish security 
thinking. The core of the Finlandisation implied that Finland was not free in its decisions, 
 
1 In Finnish widely as known the YYA treaty. 
2 Named after the presidents who were firm followers of certain principles labelled as Finlandisation. 
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and self-censorship had to be adopted to adjust to the geopolitical circumstances of Cold 
War Europe. 
When it comes to the impact of Finlandisation on Finnish politics, Rusi (2016) claims 
that Kekkonen-Paasikivi doctrine has had a serious effect on the Finnish foreign and 
security politics throughout the second half of the 20th century, and its traces are still 
visible in the Finnish politics (Rusi, 2016. pp. 89-90). Rusi argues that Finlandisation is 
sometimes seen in an unjustified positive light by some political actors in Finland, 
“Finlandisation has been turned into a success story, which can be used to preserve and 
protect the national self-esteem, but it cannot be made without embellishing the truth or 
even distorting it.”3 (Rusi, 2016, p. 14). Rusi believes that because Finlandisation is 
portrayed as a success, especially by the Finnish left, the constructed reality of the past 
distorts the reality of today (Rusi, 2016, p. 14). 
The advocates of the Kekkonen-Paasikivi doctrine, on the other hand, stress that Finland 
managed to hold distance from the Soviet Union thanks to neutrality and thereby 
maintained its independence (Tiilikainen, 2006, p. 76). More interestingly, it can be said 
that Finlandisation as such was accepted among the Finns even on the eve of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1988, 80% of the population supported the FCMA 
Treaty, suggesting that good relations the Soviet Union were important to the Finnish 
people (Forsberg, 2018, p. 4). This indicates that historical facts are not always the 
decisive factors. Rather, it is how constructed historical lessons determine the past and 
are thereby absorbed into the people's collective memory (Forsberg, 2018). For this 
reason, many Finns might see the policy of neutrality as something positive. 
Simultaneously, by the process of Finlandisation, neutrality became part of the Finnish 
identity and was seen as a guarantee of Finnish sovereignty. 
Strong self-defence capabilities are yet another part of the Finnish security-related 
identity. In this regard, the main task is to protect the neutrality and the national borders 
of Finland by building up credible self-defence structures (Pajunen, 1968, p. 85). The 
centrality of this argument stems from the experience of the Second World War. Even 
 
3 “Suomettuminen on käännetty menestystarinaksi, jolla voidaan hoitaa kansallista itsetuntoa, mutta se ei 




though Finland did not receive any significant support from the West, Finland was the 
only country that lost the war but was not occupied by other state(s), which is today 
attributed to the preparedness and strong will of the Finnish military (Pajunen, 1968, p. 
85). Therefore, the ability to protect its soil is central to the Finnish identity, and the 
country has had a conscription throughout the Cold War and even today (Pajunen, 1968, 
p. 86).  
Also, in contrast to Sweden, Finland maintained its military capabilities even after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, when it was widely believed that peace and an end to the 
political division have arrived to stay in Europe. Strong will to be prepared to defend the 
country even today is reflected by the fact that more than 70% of the population supports 
the current conscription arrangements, and 80% of the population are ready to defend the 
country in a conflict (Järvenpää, 2016, p. 6) Thus, there is a consensus in the Finnish 
society that the country must be prepared to defend itself on its own in a crisis. 
2.1.2 Finnish security politics after the Cold War period 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and annulment of the FCMA Treaty broadened 
Finland’s possibilities to practice more autonomous security and foreign politics. Indeed, 
Finland and Sweden both approached the institutions of the West by becoming members 
of the EU in 1995 and by intensifying their cooperation with NATO. By the mid-1990s, 
the old Cold War division of geopolitics had blurred completely, and a range of new 
actors4 emerged into the Finnish security thinking, who all started to influence Finnish 
foreign policy (Blombergs, 2016, p. 38). 
Finland started carefully adapting to the changing environment. In 1994, Finland became 
part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which provided a framework to 
develop cooperation with NATO and a possibility to take part in the NATO-led peace-
keeping operations (Blombergs, 2016, p. 30). Blombergs brings out that joining the PfP 
marked the outset of the deepened cooperation between Finland and NATO while still 
enabling Finland to position itself as non-aligned. As a part of this general mood of 
increased collaboration, Finland also took a decision to have the so-called NATO-option 
as early as 1994 (Forsberg, 2018, p. 5-6). A NATO-option was created with the intention 
that Finland will not seek membership in NATO right away but reserves itself a right to 
 
4 Such as the Baltic states (mainly Estonia) and the EU, in addition to NATO. 
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seek membership immediately if it feels the need to do so (Forsberg, 2018, p. 6). Hence, 
NATO membership per se was not on the table, because as argued by some Finnish 
politicians, there was no need to fix the working policy of non-alignment at the time 
(Forsberg, 2018, p. 5).  
In addition, as Forsberg notes, there might have been identity reasons why Finland wanted 
to keep the NATO membership topic distanced. Namely, Finland did not want to be 
associated with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states who were seeking 
membership in NATO at the time (Forsberg, 2018, p. 7). Moreover, Finland was initially 
detrimental towards the Alliance's enlargement into the East, as it feared that such a move 
would off-balance the existing power dynamics and create new lines of division 
(Forsberg, 2018, p. 7). 
However, the security environment did not stay as calm in post-Cold War Europe as many 
had hoped. Since 2004 there were signs that Russia is interested in restoring its power-
based influence as it had been during the Cold War, which found confirmation by the 
infamous Putin’s Munich speech, Georgian invasion in 2008 and Crimean annexation in 
2014. Derived from the Finnish geopolitical location, these developments have altered 
the perception of the security situation, which on the other hand, made the Finnish NATO-
debate more fruitful again and made Finland seek other means to improve its security 
situation (Nokkala, 2016, pp. 98-99). Most importantly, cooperation with Sweden, NATO 
and the US have been the recent outcomes of the changed circumstances (Nokkala, 2016, 
p. 99). 
For the last decades, Finland has sought to increase Nordic cooperation, whereas bilateral 
relations with Sweden have become the most crucial part of this. Cooperation with 
Sweden has intensified, especially in the second half of the 2010s (Honkanen, 2016), 
whereas during the Cold War, there were different internal and external factors hindering 
this cooperation (Salonius-Pasternak & Vanhanen, 2020). Today, the Finnish-Swedish 
partnership is based on the similarities between the two states as both are non-aligned, 
share a common history, have substantially integrated economies, and represent similar 
values (Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, 2016, p. 21). Thus, it can be said that Sweden 
constitutes an important piece of Finnish security thinking, meaning that Swedish foreign 
policy choices (in relation to NATO; understanding the security situation in the Baltic 
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Sea region) reinforce Finnish foreign policy (Forsberg, 2016, p. 372). This means that as 
long as there is no major deviation in the contemporary security policy of Sweden, 
Finland does not stand alone in moral and psychological terms. Hence, Sweden is a close 
partner of bilateral defence cooperation and an important reference point for the current 
Finnish security politics from an identity aspect. 
What begun with NATO in the framework of PfP in 1994 has developed further, and 
Finland has increased its partnership with NATO ever since. In the 1990s and 2000s, the 
emphasis of the cooperation was on crisis management as Finland was contributing to 
NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force - 
ISAF) and Kosovo (Kosovo Force - KFOR) (Forsberg, 2018, pp. 8-9).  However, over 
time, the nature of the partnership has changed to match with the nature of the 
contemporary security environment, and the current focus is increasingly on the 
interoperability between the Finnish and NATO forces (Forsberg, 2018, p. 9). Hence, the 
most recent upgrades of the partnership have most notably been the Enhanced 
Opportunities Programme (EOP) and Host Nation Support agreement. The former allows 
Finland to increase interoperability with NATO in a tailored manner, meaning that 
Finland can align its military standards with NATO by information exchange, political 
consultations, access to NATO’s training programmes and exercises in a way that takes 
into account the specific of Finland (Bergquist et al., 2017, p. 20; NATO, 2020). On the 
other hand, the Host Nation Support pact is simply put a legal framework for receiving 
military help from NATO in a case of a conflict (Forsberg, 2018, p. 8). 
Finland has also cultivated its ties with the US, especially when it comes to military 
equipment. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Finland has acquired high technology 
military machinery from the United States, most famously the F/A-18 Hornet jet fighters 
and air-defence systems (Forsberg, 2018, p. 9). Also, the US Congress has given its 
acceptance to deliver new jet fighter to Finland even today, if Finland should opt for an 
American manufacturer as per the ongoing jet fighter procurement (Keränen, 2020). In 
addition, Finland and the United States signed an agreement of bilateral defence 
cooperation in 2016, intending to deepen and enhance the security and defence-related 
cooperation between the two states (Ministry of Defence of Finland, 2016). Even though 
the pact might leave a declaratory impression, it is a sign that Finland is interested in 
enhancing its cooperation with the United States. 
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Despite the increased tensions in the security environment during the past decade, many 
Finnish politicians have shown great cautiousness in condemning Russia and its 
aggressive foreign policy moves. Rusi calls this the effect of post-Finlandisation, which 
indicates how deep-rooted Finlandisation was (Rusi, 2016, p. 131). Most visibly, many 
high-ranked Social Democrats5 but also former President Tarja Halonen has condemned 
voices in Finland which have suggested a departure from the traditional non-alliance 
principle and expressed critical notes regarding Russia’s aggressive behaviour (Rusi, 
2016, pp. 88-89; 98). On the other hand, even other mainstream parties and actors have 
generally refrained from being resolute and using strong words when addressing Russia. 
Hence, it seems that many Finnish political actors have held a constant line not to publicly 
claim that Russia might pose a military threat to Finland nor criticise Russia for its action 
(Michel, 2011, p. 2). 
When it comes to NATO membership, this question has turned out to be one of the most 
significant security-related issue causing dissent among the Finnish parties. Largely 
speaking, four parties in the Finnish parliament have taken a clear stand on the topic, 
whereas the rest of them have expressed mixed signals or are divided internally. The 
National Coalition Party and Swedish People's Party of Finland have taken a stand on 
supporting Finnish membership in NATO (Kokoomus, 2020; RKP, n.d.). While Swedish 
People’s Party concluded this decision in 2016, National Coalition Party has advocated a 
NATO membership since the mid-2000s (de Fresnes & Harala, 2016; Yle, 2006). On the 
opposite, the Left Alliance and Social Democrats have maintained a position that Finland 
should stay out of the Alliance, whereas the Left Alliance argues that a Finnish 
membership in NATO would decrease Finland’s security and Social Democrats continue 
to stress the importance of other means to increase security (Vasemmistoliitto, 2021; 
SDP, n.d.). 
In relation to the rest of the parties, the picture gets mixed, and Centre Party is a good 
example of this ambiguity. The party does not support NATO membership but argues for 
good relations with the Alliance and having the option to join the Alliance if needed (the 
NATO-option) (Keskusta, 2020). Hence, Centre Party is a traditional supporter of the 
orthodox position of non-alignment, but there are some more pro-NATO opinions within 
 
5 For instance, the former foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja and the former party leader Eero Heinäluoma. 
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the party which however constitute only a minority (Forsberg, 2018, p. 11). A similar 
situation characterises the Finns Party, which has not concluded any specific stand on 
NATO membership. This is reflected by the lack of clear-cut statements on NATO 
membership on behalf of the party. However, the current party leader Jussi Halla-Aho 
has personally suggested that Finland could join the Alliance at some point, but Finland 
should not rush on this matter (Hakahuhta, 2019). Similarly to the Finns Party, Christian 
Democrats have left the membership topic open. They support an increase in cooperation 
with NATO and state that in case Finland would opt for a membership in the future, a 
referendum should be arranged (Kristillisdemokraatit, 2016). The Green League does not 
favour membership in NATO at the moment but agrees that such a decision must be 
subject to popular vote (Vihreät, 2016). However, different party members have 
expressed various opinions regarding the topic, indicating that there is no complete 
unanimity on the issue within the Green League (Forsberg, 2018, p. 12). 
2.2 The origins and essence behind Swedish neutrality 
Sweden has a long tradition of neutrality and has managed to avoid war for over 200 
years. Even during the world wars, Swedish neutrality policy handled the pressure as the 
country was neither occupied nor forced to align, even though its neutrality lacked 
consistency with Sweden’s concessions to Germany in trade and by enabling Germans to 
transport its troops through the Swedish territory (Möller & Bjereld, 2010, p. 373; 
Nilsson, 2009, p. 305). 
During the Cold War, Sweden’s neutrality stemmed from the aspiration to uphold its 
sovereignty between the two powers of the US and the Soviet Union (Möller & Bjereld, 
2010, p. 374). In more detail, Ydén et al. (2019) argue that the Swedish neutrality policy 
during the Cold War stemmed from two fundamental considerations. The first of them 
was related to the pragmatic interest-based strategy for neutrality, according to which 
Sweden was better off when it stuck to neutrality as a mean to avoid war (Ydén et al., 
2019, p. 4). Hence, this formula suggests that neutrality during peacetime lays the basis 
for the ability to stay non-aligned in the event of war (Ojanen, 2016, p. 133). As a part of 
this doctrine, Sweden also invested a significant number of resources into its military 
capabilities because it was seen as a crucial backbone of staying neutral (Möller & 
Bjereld, 2010). Moreover, the overall positive stand on improving country’s self-defence 
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enhanced even the domestic military manufacturing, whereas Sweden became one of the 
top countries in arms export per capita (Jackson, 2014). 
The second important aspect, which became prevailing during the Cold War, was an 
ideas-based approach to neutrality, where identity and ideology-related reasonings were 
the leading advocates to maintain neutrality (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 4). According to this 
tradition, Sweden should promote normative values in the international domain and argue 
for clear rules regarding the use of force (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 4). Indeed, Sweden became 
involved internationally to promote diplomacy and cooperation, as it was convinced that 
security could be enhanced by international engagement in addition to national defence 
(Sundelius, 1990, p. 122). Furthermore, Ojanen argues that neutrality and non-alignment 
were intertwined and merged into a higher moral value than pure neutrality, meaning that 
Sweden seek recognition as a power of morality and was therefore ready to condemn and 
criticise certain moves of both sides of the Cold War. Hence, in some ways, Sweden was 
seen as an impartial force and a bridge-builder between the rivalling sides of the Cold 
War (Sundelius, 1990, p. 122).  
But this moralistic strain did not only have externally signalled objectives. Furthermore, 
this kind of positive ‘force for good’ was seen as enhancing the internal cohesion of the 
Swedish society and thereby increasing the political legitimacy of the Swedish authorities 
(Ojanen, 2016, p. 133). As a result of this process, neutrality became over the years a part 
of the national identity, and Sweden’s neutrality became a brand on its own (Michel, 
2011, p. 10). Thus, the Swedish official approach to the Cold War division could be seen 
as ‘third way’ between the powers of the West and East. 
2.2.1 Double structure of neutrality 
On the other hand, Sweden’s Cold War dichotomy between the two sides of neutrality is 
not as simple as it seems. Ydén et al. argue that there has been a clear difference between 
what was being said and what was being done in the Swedish foreign policy (Ydén et al., 
2019, p. 2). In specific, there seemed to be a difference between the reality of the Swedish 
military doctrines and the official political rhetoric. Based on the investigations and 
published reports in Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s, several authors have noted 
that in the case of war in Europe, Sweden was considered a part of the Western military 
preparation and was de facto incorporated into NATO’s wartime infrastructure (Nilsson, 
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2009; Ydén et al., 2019, p. 9; Tunander, 1999, Ojanen, 2016, p. 134). The main focus of 
the cooperation during peacetime was done in intelligence and airspace (Agrell, 2006). 
From the Swedish side, motivation for accepting to these classified arrangements 
originated from the fear that in the case of war, Sweden would be dragged into the war 
anyhow (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 9). For NATO, the airspace of Sweden provided a vital part 
of protecting NATO’s Nordic members in the case of a conflict with the Soviet Union 
due to the strategic value of Sweden’s geographical location (Nilsson, 2009). 
In addition, Sweden had close links directly with the US and was prepared to host 
American military aircraft on its soil in during an outbreak of a conflict with the Soviet 
Union (Tunander, 1999). Moreover, Sweden was covered by the nuclear umbrella of the 
US, at least since the 1960s (Tunander, 1999). These arrangements were kept in such 
secrecy that most of them was not even written on paper but communicated and 
transferred orally. As General John Vessey, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, described military cooperation between the two countries: “when it comes to 
Sweden, there was only one rule: Nothing on paper.” (Tunander, 1999, pp. 184-185). 
Hence, the great contradiction of Swedish neutrality politics lied in the fact that the core 
security arrangements had to be kept secret, as this informal alliance was not compatible 
with the official (self-) image of Swedish neutrality. These previously unknown facts 
from the Cold War days have initiated a new type of inquiries whether Swedish neutrality 
was, after all, the cornerstone of its successful foreign policy during the Cold War, 
whereas strategically important arrangements were conducted in secrecy (Ojanen, 2016, 
p. 134).  Also, it clearly shows the tensions between the interest-based and identity-based 
security politics, which were perhaps even more significant than previously known. This 
leads to the questions of how to perceive Swedish security politics today. 
2.2.2 Swedish security politics after the Cold War period 
The end of the Cold War simultaneously meant changes in Swedish foreign and security 
politics. The first meaningful change implied that Sweden abandoned its strict attachment 
to neutrality, which was also marked by Swedish politicians who started to stress the non-
alignment in terms of military alliances over political neutrality (Ojanen, 2016, p. 136; 
Ydén et al., 2019, p. 11). The earliest implication of this was witnessed in 1991 when 
Sweden decided to head towards the EU and became a member of the Union in 1995 
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together with Finland. Sweden also started to approach NATO and has become a close 
partner of the Alliance through the decades. Hence, neutrality became a policy among the 
others, not an aim on its own (Ojanen, 2016, p. 139). 
The second significant shift was seen in the priorities of Swedish security politics. 
Contrary to Finland, the security paradigm took a considerable transformation as Sweden 
started to retreat from the traditional territorial defence strategy and increased emphasis 
on security-related politics on the international level, where the major goal became the 
protection of the liberty and rights of individuals (Westberg, 2016, p. 413; Ojanen, 2016, 
p. 141) Thus, the central topics of the Swedish security politics were increasingly not so 
much about the military security per se, but rather the security of human lives, democracy 
and human rights (Ojanen, 2016, p. 141). As Ojanen also notes, the changed priorities 
were also reflected on the state budget, whereas less resources were allocated to the 
Swedish territorial defence and participating in the international peace operations became 
de facto the only objective of the Swedish military (Ojanen, 2016, p. 142). As a result of 
the years-lasted cuts in the military spending and decommissioning of conventional 
military troops in Sweden, the country found itself in a position where it could not defend 
its territory. According to a high-ranked Swedish military official’s acknowledgement in 
2012, Sweden was not capable of defending its territory for more than one week in a case 
of military conflict (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 14). 
Swedish security debate was brought back into the spotlight in 2014 when a severe 
deterioration of the security environment took place. As the Swedish government noted 
in its proposal 2014, the events of the Crimea “… are the biggest challenge to the 
European security structure since its establishment a quarter of a century ago.”6 
(Swedish Government, 2015, p. 2). Due to this, it is argued that non-alignment lost all of 
its practical relevance, and Sweden needed to update its defence and security strategies 
(Westberg, 2016). Sweden has thereafter increased military cooperation with Finland, the 
US and NATO, and started to reform its defence sector again for re-establishing sufficient 
military capabilities. 
 
6 “Det är den största utmaningen mot den europeiska säkerhetsordningen sedan den etablerades för ett 
kvarts sekel sedan.” (Swedish Government, 2015, p. 2). Translated from Swedish by the author. 
33 
 
Regarding cooperation with NATO, Sweden signed the Host Nation Support pact in 2016 
similarly to Finland, which allows Sweden to receive help from NATO and potentially 
use Swedish territory in a case of emergency by NATO (Møller, 2019, p. 242). Also, in 
2017, Sweden hosted the most extensive military exercise on its soil after the Cold War, 
Aurora 2017, which was remarkable in many ways. As Yden et al. note, “For the first 
time on Swedish territory, Swedish soldiers prepared for operations side-by-side with US 
tanks and soldiers– a sight that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.“ (Ydén 
et al., 2019, p. 13). In addition, the domestic NATO debate has also been affected by the 
changing security environment. As of 2019, all the centre-right (Alliance7) parties are 
now favouring a Swedish NATO membership, and Swedish Democrats expressed their 
support for a NATO-option in late 2020, meaning that there is now a majority in the 
Swedish parliament supporting even closer attachment to NATO (Ydén et al., 2019; 
Rydberg, 2020). Hence, as of today there exists a clear dichotomy among the major 
traditional parties on the NATO issue, whereas the Alliance parties support membership, 
and the red-green bloc8 opposes it. 
In addition to NATO, partnership with the United States has increasingly become 
important for Sweden. Especially since the events in Crimea, Sweden started to intensify 
its networks of military cooperation with external partners, whereas the transatlantic link 
is one of the priorities (Brattberg, 2017, p. 24). Hence, by developing bilateral ties to the 
US, Sweden builds parallel links with the US, in addition to the existing partnership 
within NATO’s framework. 
In recent years, there has been much discussion of increasing military cooperation with 
Finland, and the idea seems to enjoy comprehensive support in both countries, especially 
on the political level. However, some scholars have pointed out that from a pure military-
strategic viewpoint of Sweden, there are critical questions to be asked vis-à-vis increased 
Swedish-Finnish military cooperation, especially when it comes to the different nature of 
the countries’ military build-up and doctrine (Edström et al., 2016, pp. 120-121). Also, 
stronger ties to Finland would simultaneously count as a step towards the east, meaning 
that there are two sides of the coin in the increased Finnish-Swedish partnership for the 
 
7 In Swedish known as the Alliansen, consists of Moderates, Liberals, Centre Party and Christian 
Democrats. 
8 Consisted of Social Democrats, Green Party and Left Party. 
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Swedish perspective (Ojanen, 2016, p. 151). However, as mentioned, at least on the 
political level, Sweden considers it essential to strengthen its military partnership with 
Finland, and the two countries have conducted several military exercises on a bilateral 
basis but also as a part of other frameworks during the past years (Swedish Armed Forces, 
n.d.). 
2.3 A joint overview of the Finnish and Swedish security politics 
Since the end of the Cold War, Finland and Sweden have abandoned the doctrine of 
neutrality, become involved in Western institutions, and advocated a military non-
alignment instead of neutrality. Both countries have also been developing their security 
ties to other states and organisations, which has intensified especially on the other half of 
the 2010s after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. As of today, both countries have bilateral 
defence cooperation with the US, NATO, and within the Nordic states, whereas Nordic 
Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is the most notable framework within this. In 
addition to Finland and Sweden, this military cooperation encompasses even Norway, 
Denmark and Iceland, and is considered one of the most effective regional defence 
cooperation formats (Pyykönen, 2016, p. 41). 
Finland and Sweden provide an interesting security phenomenon as both countries have 
gradually approached the Alliance by increasing their interoperability, conducting regular 
exercises and training with NATO, but are still hesitating to take the final step towards 
membership. Some scholars have started to call this a paradox of post-neutrality, whereas 
both states are pursuing a close partnership with NATO as possible while excluding the 
possibility of an actual membership (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2001).   
Hence, it can be said that on the surface, the security situation of the two Nordic states 
appears to be similar in multiple ways. However, there are some meaningful differences 
in the reasoning behind security politics, most notably related to history and constructed 
identities. For Finland, non-alignment evokes positive connotations regarding the 
survival of its sovereignty during after the Second World War and during the Cold War 
(Forsberg, 2018, pp. 19-20). In addition, Swedish non-alignment only strengthens Finnish 
attachment to the non-alignment by providing a ‘security club’ to belong to (Forsberg, 
2018, pp. 19-20). For Sweden, non-alignment is still some sort of ethical choice that has 
followed Swedish identity since the Cold War days (Forsberg, 2018, p. 16). 
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Based on the above, the question of acting together or alone has always had its place in 
the academic discussion of Finnish-Swedish comparison in the field of security and 
defence (Rusi, 2016). Even though there exists a mutual understanding9 that possible a 
NATO membership is assessed together (Gummesson, 2016), none of the states has 
excluded the possibility of individual initiatives in this matter. This could be the case 
especially for Sweden, since the country had de facto security guarantees during the Cold 
War (Tunander, 1999), and the current build-up of Swedish defence policies suggests that 
Swedes have a tacit expectation of receiving military aid from other actors in a case of a 
conflict, while Finland does not take such assistance for granted (Pyykönen, 2016, p. 16).  
In addition, the Swedish declaration in 1991 to join the EU came as a somewhat surprise 
for Finland, suggesting that Sweden did not provide Finland sufficient consultation about 
this intention (Rusi, 2016, p. 168). Taken together, far-reaching changes in security are 
possible, and if one of the countries should, for example, become a member of NATO, it 
has a great effect on the NATO question in the neighbouring state. However, history has 
shown that individual initiatives are more likely to originate from Sweden and according 
to Rusi, Sweden will eventually conclude its security dilemmas individually from its own 
point of view, it has done before (Rusi 2016, p. 185). This, accordingly, would put Finland 
into a position where it would be hard not to follow suit (Rusi, 2016, pp. 168-173; 
Forsberg, 2018, p. 19). 
 
9 Both states have expressed a belief that possible steps towards NATO membership should be taken 




The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodological aspects of 
this work. This research is guided by the interpretivist epistemology and employs 
qualitative content analysis as the primary tool to approach the chosen data of 
parliamentary debate. The research design is based on a cross-country comparison, as this 
work brings out the changed nature of the security debate in Sweden and Finland after 
the events of Crimea in 2014. 
3.1 Research design  
This work applies comparative research design to determine whether the Swedish and 
Finnish mainstream political circles have perceived the changed security circumstances 
similarly or not, and what conclusions can be drawn from these altered perceptions. To 
reach this goal, this work approaches the topic by interpreting and comparing the 
standpoints of the Swedish and Finnish political parties represented in their respective 
parliaments and then proceeding with a cross-national comparison between these two 
states. A cross-national comparison is “an approach to knowing social reality through 
the examination for similarities and differences between data gathered from more than 
one nation.” (Elder, 1976, p. 210). 
There are many reasons to opt for a comparative study. Firstly, comparison can be seen 
as the origin of all research related to political science because a lot of reasoning and 
argumentation is derived from the comparison (Toshkov, 2016, p. 258). Secondly, social 
phenomenon such as deteriorated security situation can be understood better if there is a 
comparison moment of different actors’ perception towards the social phenomenon 
(Bryman, 2016, pp. 64-65). Finally, the third reason derives from the current political 
situation of these states. As Sweden and Finland are the only states in the region of North-
East Europe10 that are officially non-aligned, thereby constituting a ‘vacuum’ between 
NATO and Russia, it would be insufficient to examine Sweden’s and Finland’s solutions 
to tackle the current security challenge individually.  
Therefore, a cross-national approach to the topic becomes handful because by examining 
the same issue on two states with different socio-cultural settings, greater understanding 
 
10 Considered as Western states. 
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of the similarities and differences between the two states vis-à-vis the case can be gained 
(Bryman, 2016, pp. 65-67). Taken together, this research design allows to gain greater 
knowledge about the effects of the changed security environment on Sweden and Finland, 
which correspondingly also provides a better understanding of the current security setting 
in Europe. 
This research is based on constructivist ontology, which implies that social phenomena 
are taking place because of social actors who interact, meaning also that the social life is 
in constant change (Bryman, 2016, p. 29). Furthermore, this ontological stand matches 
the interpretivist nature of this research because it acknowledges that reality is a product 
of social action and may be different for different actors11, making reality subjective 
(Ryan, 2018; Bryman, 2016, p. 29). Hence, the chosen epistemological and ontological 
stands influence how the data is approached in the sense that the data requires 
interpretation, which correspondingly requiring greater responsibility from the author. 
The following section continues with introducing the chosen method. 
3.2 Method 
Due to the nature of the chosen data, it was found most suitable to apply qualitative 
content analysis (QCA) as the main tool of processing the empirical material. QCA is a 
method that enables to organise and analyse qualitative data, such as written or verbal 
communication, in a systematic manner (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 108). QCA is often used 
as a method when dealing with material that needs interpretation because, according to 
the interpretivist paradigm, data never speaks for itself, and therefore it is the researcher’s 
task to attribute meaning to it (Schreier, 2012, p. 5). An additional feature of the QCA is 
that it helps to reduce the amount of data, meaning that the study will limit the analysis 
only to those parts of data, which are reflecting the central aspects originating from the 
research inquiry (Schreier, 2012, p. 5). Thus, it can be said that the main benefit of QCA 
is that it is systematic while staying flexible, and it is practical because it helps to reduce 
the amount of data. 
When going into more specifics, coding is an underlying feature of QCA. It is a unique 
way of structuring data within QCA by dividing central themes into categories and 
 
11 Domestically and between the two states. 
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subcategories, thereby creating an entity called the coding frame (Schreier, 2012, pp. 60-
62). The coding frame becomes thereafter a central reference object used to categorise 
the data, which in this study means that political debates of different politicians are 
labelled and categorised accordingly. The biggest benefit of the coding process is that it 
helps to filter out the most meaningful parts of the data (Schreier, 2012, p. 7). In this case, 
this study deals with qualitative data of parliamentary speeches and debates that need 
interpretation to comprehend the internal and external dynamics of Swedish and Finnish 
security politics. To achieve that, speeches from different political parties in their 
respective parliaments were analysed. The explicit logic of sampling will be presented in 
the ‘data and sources’ section. 
The coding frame of this research consists of three different dimensions. On the first 
dimension, there are questions of NATO membership with subcategories of ‘Yes’, ‘No’ 
or ‘Mixed’. The second dimension measures politicians' view on national military 
capabilities with subcategories of ‘Increase’, ‘Decrease’ or ‘Maintain the current level’. 
Finally, the last category assesses politicians' stand on military cooperation and has 
subcategories of ‘Increase’, ‘Decrease’, ‘Maintain the current course’, whereas this 
category has a sub-dimension regarding the subject: ‘the US’, ‘NATO’ and ‘the Nordic 
states’. A visualised version of the coding frame can be found in Figure 1. 



























Figure 1. Coding frame of the research. 
Source: the author. 
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As argued, QCA as a method is widely applicable and can be employed differently, 
depending on the aim of the research. Therefore, it would be relevant to determine the 
exact approach of the QCA as applied in this thesis. Hsieh & Shannon (2005) have 
suggested three approaches of QCA: conventional, directed, and summative. How this 
work applies QCA matches the characteristics of what Hsieh & Shannon have labelled as 
directed content analysis. In this approach, the theoretical framework or theory aids 
determining the codes of the coding framework (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, pp. 1281-1283). 
This means that some categories in the coding frame were already set before analysing 
the data, whereas the predetermined part of the coding frame is guided by the conceptual 
framework and previous research. 
Hence, directed content analysis in this work is at least partly applied deductively, in a 
concept-driven way because some of the categories were chosen based on the previous 
research, where the key categories were identified (Schreier, 2012, p. 60).  
3.3 Empirical data and sources  
The empirical data of this research consists of parliamentary debate and speeches held in 
the Parliament of Finland12 and the Parliament of Sweden13, meaning that political parties 
are the central actors. Observation of parliamentary parties was found the most suitable 
way to detect the change because political discussion in parliaments is the highest domain 
of debate prior to legislative change, at least in democratic states. This means that all 
possible reactions to external changes are legislatively initiated by the governments and 
debated by the parliaments. Hence, by studying the debates of Finnish and Swedish 
political parties, the general perception and mood can be determined vis-à-vis the changes 
in the security environment. This, correspondingly, which puts this study also on safe 
grounds in terms of validity. Another minor aspect worth mentioning concerns reliably. 
As this research deals with primary data in a written form acquired from original sources, 
there should not be any issues regarding the reliability of the data. 
The speeches and debates were retrieved from the websites of both parliaments, 
https://www.riksdagen.se/  and https://www.eduskunta.fi/, where one can find all 
parliamentary debates in transcription and video format. Three debates from both 
 
12 Eduskunta in Finnish. 
13 Sveriges Riksdag in Swedish. 
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countries were chosen within the timeframe of 2015-2020, whereas each of them 
contained around 70-110 speeches which were analysed on paragraph level and then 
categorised accordingly as explained above. Hence, the unit of analysis was paragraph. 
All debates were based on different reports prepared by the governments or special 
committee(s) of the respective countries. 
The following debates were chosen for Finland: ‘Government’s foreign and security 
policy report’14 conducted in 2016, ‘Government’s defence report’15 conducted in 2017 
and ‘Government’s foreign and security policy report’ conducted in 2020. A similar logic 
guided the Swedish selection of debates: ‘Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 
2016-2020’16 conducted in 2015, ‘Defence policy report of the Defence Committee’17 
conducted in 2017 and ‘Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025’ 
conducted in 2020. While selecting suitable the debates for analysis, the goal was to find 
similar debates between the two countries in terms of subject of matter and time of 
conduct. This turned out to be successful. 
It is also important to stress that this work uses empirical material in their native 
languages, i.e., in Swedish and Finnish, meaning that this work deals with primary data. 
This brings up two important advantages worth mentioning: as suggested above, original 
sources can be seen as increasing reliability in comparison to secondary sources, and 
secondly, the results of this research can have more scientific value. 
3.4 Operationalisation 
Each piece of data, i.e., the speeches, was placed into a coding frame category. As 
introduced in the method section, speeches chosen for analysis were divided into three 
different sections by topic: NATO membership, military cooperation and national 
military capabilities. These themes were picked to map the discourse and discussion 
among the decision-makers in Sweden and Finland as these indicators were found to be 
most suitable in reflecting the security debate based on the theoretical framework and 
 
14 Valtioneuvoston ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko. Translated from Finnish by the author. 
15 Valtioneuvoston puolustusselonteko. Translated from Finnish by the author. 
16 Säkerhetspolitisk inriktning - Sveriges försvar för perioden 2016-2020. Translated from Swedish by the 
author. 
17 Säkerhetspolitik. Utrikesutskottets betänkande. Translated from Swedish by the author. 
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previous research. The following tables (Table 1, Table 2, Table 3) explain the logic of 
how the speeches were categorised. 






Mixed position on 
NATO membership 
Description 
There are elements in 
the speech that 
clearly suggest a pro-
NATO membership 
stand 
There are elements in 
the speech that 




There are elements in 
the speech that 
cannot be clearly 
interpreted as a pro- 




articulates that the 
country should join 
NATO 
The speaker 
articulates that the 
country should not 
join NATO 
The speaker does not 
take a clear stand on 
the issue or takes a 
somewhat neutral 
stand, e.g., suggest a 
NATO-option 
Source: the author. 
Table 2. Code guide of military cooperation. 
Name 





Maintain the current 
level of military 
cooperation / mixed 
position 
Description 
There are elements 
in the speech that 
clearly suggest 
increase in military 
cooperation with 
foreign actor(s) 
There are elements 
in the speech that 
clearly suggest 
decrease in military 
cooperation with 
foreign actor(s) 
There are elements in 
the speech that speak 
for maintaining the 
current level of 
military cooperation 
with foreign actor(s) / 





The speaker speaks 
for decreased 
The speaker does not 




with foreign actor(s) 
military cooperation 
with foreign actor(s) 
increasing/decreasing 
military cooperation 
with foreign actor(s) or 
the opinion is mixed 
Third dimension of 
the code: subject 
The Nordic states, 
NATO, the US 
The Nordic states, 
NATO, the US 
The Nordic states, 
NATO, the US 
Source: the author. 
Table 3. Code guide of national military capabilities. 
Name 






Maintain the current 
balance of national 
military capabilities 
/ mixed position 
Description 
There are elements 




There are elements 
in the speech that 
clearly suggest 
decrease in national 
military capabilities 
There are elements in 
the speech that cannot 






The speaker suggest 
that the country 
should increase its 
military spending 
The speaker suggests 
that the country 
should decrease its 





importance of the 
military defence but 
does not argue for 
strengthening it 
Source: the author. 
3.5 Limitations 
Derived from the chosen method, QCA, the research might be a subject of criticism in 
terms of objectivity. However, as this is an interpretivist research, it is acknowledged that 
the words of politicians are a matter of interpretation and the role of the author is meant 
to be bigger in comparison to a research with positivistic epistemology.  
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Another limitation can be brought up in terms of data. As mentioned, the data is in either 
Swedish or Finnish in its original form. Even though the author masters both languages 
on an advanced level, something may always be lost in translation. In order to avoid this, 
the author has used all available tools to prevent this, for instance, by consulting with 
different dictionaries and with native speakers if needed, even though this was a rare 
occurrence and can therefore be seen as a minor limitation of this work.  
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4 Data presentation and analysis 
This section of the research presents the data and analysis. Firstly, there will be a country-
specific data presentation which is directly followed by an intra-level analysis. Finally, 
the conclusive reflection on the findings is yielded in the cross-country analysis section, 
which can be seen as the paramount part of the analysis. In addition, when going through 
data presentation, it should be noted that cooperation and military cooperation are used 
interchangeably, as the meaning of cooperation in this context refers to a collaboration in 
the military domain.  
4.1 Post-Crimea security debate in the Finnish parliament 
4.1.1 Power dynamics of the Finnish parties during the debates 
During the first two debates, Finland had a centre-right government lead by Juha Sipilä 
(Centre Party), and the coalition included Centre Party, the National Coalition Party and 
the Finns Party. Hence, it can be argued that the centre-right parties had a dominant 
position in the parliament, which might have found reflection in a way that left-wing 
parties were more critical towards the government’s reports during the first two debates. 
In 2019, Finland had a general election, and Finland got a coalition inclined towards the 
left. During the last examined debate, Finland was led by Sanna Marin (Social 
Democrats), and the coalition was comprised of Social Democrats, Centre Party, the 
Green League, the Left Alliance and the Swedish People's Party of Finland. This means 
that during the last debate, the left-wing parties were in a power position, as they had 
gained more seats in comparison with the two previous debates. The exact division of 
seats after the elections in 2015 and 2019 can be found in Appendix 1. 
4.1.2 Finnish Government’s foreign and security policy report in 2016 
The first debate was based on the Finnish government’s foreign and security policy report 
where the purpose was to provide an overview of the contemporary security situation. 
The codes of this debate are available in Appendix 2. 
NATO membership 
The first category scrutinised parties’ perception towards NATO membership. In this 
debate, two parties favoured Finnish membership in NATO – the National Coalition Party 
and the Swedish People's Party of Finland. The National Coalition Party had a rather 
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strong position on this question, and they argued that Finland should become a member 
of the Alliance because they see NATO as the only reliable security guarantee for Europe 
and for Finland alike. A similar view was shared by the Swedish People's Party of Finland, 
who justified their pro-NATO stand with the fact that membership would be the only way 
to ensure Finnish security in a case of war, a belief which the Alliance parties also share 
in Sweden. As argued by Stefan Wallin (Swedish People's Party of Finland): “Here we 
share a belief with the Alliance bloc in Sweden. The Alliance parties have suggested that 
Sweden should join NATO because in a case of a conflict the Baltic Sea region, it would 
be better and safer if Sweden would belong to the Western defence alliance NATO.”18 
(Finnish Parliament, 2016).  
Understandably, there was another view towards the possible NATO membership, which 
was not supportive of the idea. This block consisted of Centre Party, Social Democrats, 
the Left Alliance and the Green League. The most common argument for opposing the 
membership was motivated by an understanding that any deviation from the traditional 
line of non-alignment would harm Finnish security. It was also argued that Finland should 
seek to hold good relations with all of its neighbours, which can best be achieved by 
staying non-aligned, whereas military non-alignment ensures that Finnish territory cannot 
be used for hostile activities against anyone. Another noteworthy remark was made by 
Eero Heinäluoma (Social Democrats), arguing that changes in the security situation are 
largely overstressed: “The suggested changes in the security environment have been 
illustrated with extra heavy brushes.”19 (Finnish Parliament, 2016). 
The third group of NATO opinions consisted mainly of the representatives of the Finns 
Party and Centre Party. Here, the central argument was that Finland must have the NATO-
option, meaning that Finland leaves itself the right to seek membership whenever it feels 
it necessary. According to both parties, this was important for the sake of having 
manoeuvring room in security and foreign politics. In addition, Kari Kulmala (Finns 
 
18 “Här är vi inne på samma linje som det borgerliga blocket i Sverige. Allianspartierna har flaggat för att 
Sverige ska gå med i Nato och de delar vår syn att vid en potentiell militär konflikt kring Östersjön är det 
bättre och tryggare om vi tillhör den västliga försvarsalliansen Nato.” (Finnish Parliament, 2016). 
Translated from Swedish by the author. 
19 “Tätä turvallisuusympäristön muutosta on maalattu erittäin raskain pensselein.” (Finnish Parliament, 
2016). Translated from Finnish by the author. 
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Party) linked the Finnish decision regarding membership with Sweden’s stand on the 
issue.  
Military cooperation 
The next topic examined parties’ perception of military cooperation. All Finnish parties 
except the Left Alliance stressed the need to increase military cooperation with the Nordic 
states, but most importantly with Sweden. Many parties argued that Sweden is something 
unique for Finland, and military partnership between the two countries is something given 
and natural thing to have. For example, as Centre Party argued, no boundaries should be 
set when it comes to cooperation with Sweden. Also, as suggested by Jaana Pelkonen 
(National Coalition Party), the changing nature of the security environment creates a 
situation where Finland cannot rely on its own, and therefore thigh partnership with 
Sweden becomes vital. 
Some parties also argued that Finland should also elaborate its partnership with the United 
States. For example, the Finns Party acknowledges that America’s presence in Europe 
contributes to the common good because it increases security in the region. Ilkka Kanerva 
(National Coalition Party) also believed that despite the current situation of the Finnish 
NATO membership debate, links with the US are also essential and must be reinforced. 
In addition, the Finns Party also mention the need to increase military cooperation with 
NATO itself. 
On the other hand, the Left Alliance and the Green League remained critical towards 
cooperating with the US and NATO and presented arguments in favour of reducing such 
cooperation. Their main claim was that the current cooperation forms with the US and 
NATO undermine the Finnish doctrine of non-alignment and that NATO’s and the US’s 
presence in the Baltic Sea area contributes to increased tensions.  
The third type of position acknowledged the importance of maintaining all current 
partnerships, i.e., the Nordic States, the US and NATO. This was mainly addressed by 
Centre Party and Social Democrats, who argued that all types of partnerships are essential 





National military capabilities 
Lastly, the question of national military capabilities did not find that much reflection in 
this debate. However, the Left Alliance and Centre Party suggested that the current level 
of military capabilities should be maintained. While the Left Alliance argued that 
accumulated military power in the Baltic Sea area does not solve the issue of increased 
tensions, Centre Party toned the importance of the country’s self-defence capabilities, 
where a conscription-based army plays a vital role in the Finnish defence. 
4.1.3 Finnish Government’s defence report in 2017 
The second Finnish debate was about the government’s defence account accepted earlier 
in 2017, meaning that the focus of the discussion was on the current situation of the 
Finnish defence and the future of if, for example, on the planned investments. The entire 
list of codes of this debate are presented in Appendix 3. 
NATO membership 
As this debate was more inward focused because of the nature of the debate’s topic, the 
NATO question did not find that much coverage. Pro-NATO statements were expressed 
by the National Coalition Party, who claimed that Finland’s best security interests are 
served if Finland has the NATO door open and join the Alliance someday. However, it 
was acknowledged that membership alone is not the solution to security-related 
challenges. Therefore, arguments against NATO membership found more reflection in 
this debate than the pro-NATO stands.  
The shared focus of the opposing view was that the orthodox line of non-alignment has 
been beneficial for Finland, and by following that principle, Finland can avoid becoming 
involved in a military conflict. Hence, Finland should stay out of NATO. Furthermore, 
membership in the Alliance would put Finland in danger, as argued by Satu Taavitsainen 
(Social Democrats) and Mika Niikko (Finns Party). Lastly, a mixed position on NATO 
membership was represented by Stefan Wallin (Swedish People's Party of Finland), who 
noted that Finland should ensure that there would not be any obstacles to join NATO if 






The second topic concerned the question of military cooperation. Many Finnish parties 
brought up the need to increase Finnish ties to the Nordic states, especially to Sweden. 
The main arguments stressed the importance of not acting alone, and Sweden was 
mentioned as an important ally to deepen cooperation with. For example, Christian 
Democrats argued that Finland must increase its cooperation with Sweden due to the 
changed nature of threats. Social Democrats, on the other hand, saw that increased 
partnership with Sweden would strengthen the security of the whole region. The National 
Coalition Party argued that increased cooperation with Sweden benefits the credibility of 
Finnish defence. 
Simultaneously, the National Coalition Party stressed the importance of increasing 
partnership with the United States, whereas their main argument was that the changed 
situation requires cooperation with many different parties, including the US. Moreover, 
other right-wing parties stressed the importance of NATO in this regard as well. Here, the 
arguments were similar: Finland needs to increase the partnership with NATO because 
more can be achieved security-wise with partners than alone. In addition to the National 
Coalition Party, these views were expressed by Christian Democrats and the Swedish 
People's Party of Finland.  
When it comes to decreasing military cooperation, none of the parties expressed the view 
that this should be done in relation to the Nordic states. However, members of the Left 
Alliance and Social Democrats argued against a partnership with NATO, and the Left 
Alliance against a partnership with the US. Their main concern was that if Finland was 
about to cooperate with NATO and the US, Finland’s territory could potentially be used 
for hostile activities against other states, which accordingly does not correspond to the 
self-claimed non-alignment of Finland. 
The third type of reflections regarding military cooperation addressed the need to 
maintain the current partnerships. Here, most of the codes included speeches by the Finns 
Party, Centre Party but also Social Democrats. In this section, the arguments were similar 
as for the need for increased cooperation which all concluded that Finland is a small 
country and therefore must rely on external cooperation for a safer security environment. 
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Many of the speeches also reflected an understanding that the current military cooperation 
with external actors is a strong pillar of the Finnish defence. 
National military capabilities 
The last code group of national military capabilities included the most codes because the 
national defence was the central theme of the debate itself. In this dimension, there existed 
largely speaking two types of an opinion. One of them saw that Finland should increase 
its national military capabilities, meaning more resources and funds to be allocated to the 
defence sector. This view was shared by all the parties except the Left Alliance and the 
Green League. The greatest attention of this debate was addressed on the two major 
procurements of Finnish defence forces, Laivue 202020 for new military vessels and the 
HX-procurement21 of new jet fighters, whereas the price tag for them in total reached 
almost 10 billion euros. However, as mentioned, most of the parties acknowledged the 
heavy price and supported the planned investments. Such parties stressed the need to 
adapt to the changed nature of security and the need to keep up the Finnish defence's 
credibility. For example, Sofia Vikman (National Coalition Party) argued that Finland 
could not neglect its own military capabilities, despite the increased international 
cooperation.  
As already mentioned, there was an opposing view towards the increased national 
military capabilities as well, represented by the Green League and the Left Alliance. The 
arguments of the opposition can be presented by two major concerns. The first of them is 
related to the cost estimate of the planned procurements, which both parties believed to 
be too high. As exemplified by Paavo Arhinmäki (Left Alliance), spending 15-20% of 
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) on a single procurement is not rational. The 
second argument for decreasing the national military capabilities was related to the 
overall militarisation in the region. As argued by Krista Mikkonen (Green League), there 
are no winners in the race of armament, which is the reason why they oppose the 
suggested procurements and increased militarisation of Finland. Krista Mikkonen (Green 
 
20 Laivue 2020 is a procurement of the Finnish Marine Forces, which will replace many of the old vessels 
that will be decommissioned during the following years (Finnish Defence Forces, n.d.) 
21 HX-procurement is a procurement of the Finnish Air Forces which will replace all current jet fighters by 
the year of 2025. The H stands for the current jet fighters (Hornet) and X stands for the replacement, which 
in this case is currently unknown and marked with X (Ministry of Defence, n.d.). 
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League): “It should be said out loud that any increase in the defence budget is a negative 
thing and can be seen as an indicator of an unsuccessful foreign policy.”22 (Finnish 
Parliament, 2017). 
Code ‘maintain the current level of military capabilities/mixed position’ was not 
distinguished in this debate. 
4.1.4 Finnish Government’s foreign and security policy report in 2020 
The third debate under scrutiny concerned the Finnish Government’s report from 2020 
regarding the contemporary security environment for Finland and the central goals in the 
security domain to pursue for Finland to improve its security. The codes of this debate 
can be found in Appendix 4. 
NATO membership 
Once again, the first topic to cover was NATO membership. Here, two parties were 
arguing for a Finnish membership in the Alliance, the National Coalition Party and the 
Swedish People's Party of Finland. Both parties saw the membership as an important 
milestone for Finland to pursue, as they claimed that NATO membership would 
strengthen the security of Finland. Jaana Pelkonen (National Coalition Party) suggested 
that the issue of Finnish NATO membership should be put under scrutiny and studied 
more extensively. Eva Biaudet (Swedish People's Party of Finland) highlighted that 
Finland must be able to decide upon its alignment policies freely and that the country has 
the opportunity to become a member of the Alliance one day.   
The spectrum of the anti-NATO membership stances of the debate consisted of two 
parties: the Left Alliance and Centre Party. The Left Alliance argued that the Finnish 
tradition of security politics is incompatible with what NATO represents. Finland should 
work for promoting peace through reconciliation, i.e., not become a part of the conflict 
which alignment with NATO would, according to the Left Alliance eventually mean. 
Additionally, the Left Alliance argued that NATO is a foundation to protect the interest 
of the US, where the small states play the role of protecting the US’s interests. Tuomas 
Kettunen (Centre Party) reminded that NATO membership is not compatible with the 
 
22 “On syytä sanoa ääneen, että puolustusbudjetin kasvattaminen on aina huono asia ja kertoo osaltaan 
ulkopolitiikan epäonnistumisesta.” (Finnish Parliament, 2017). Translated from Finnish by the author. 
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Finnish non-alignment policy, and the country should count on partnership with Sweden 
and its own military capabilities instead. 
Lastly, the mixed signals regarding possible NATO membership were declared by Centre 
Party and Finns Party. Here the main arguments suggested that NATO partnership is one 
pillar of the Finnish defence and that Finland reserves itself a right to seek NATO 
membership if it feels necessary, as stated already in 1994 when the partnership began. 
The Finns Party also noted that in case there would emerge a more serious discussion 
about possible NATO membership, this decision should only be taken based on detailed 
calculations. 
Military cooperation 
As in the two previous Finnish debates, many of the parties and speakers highlighted the 
importance of Finnish cooperation within the Nordics, especially in relation to Sweden. 
Almost all of the parties except the Left Alliance expressed the need to increase the 
bilateral work with Sweden. Once again, many speakers justified the need for partnership 
with Sweden because the security situation has deteriorated, and the best Finland can do 
to counterbalance this is to increase partnership with Sweden in terms of security. In more 
specific, Ilkka Kanerva (National Coalition Party) suggested that Finland and Sweden 
could form an official agreement to assist each other in case of a war or crisis. Kimmo 
Kiljunen (Finns Party), on the other hand, spoke about the reasons why Sweden is such 
an important partner for Finland and brought up the close relations between the countries 
in terms of history, culture, and good relations. When it comes to military cooperation 
with the US, Ilkka Kanerva (National Coalition Party) believed that despite the current 
state of the NATO debate, Finland should pursue to increase the bilateral partnership with 
the US. Codes of increased military cooperation with NATO did not find applicability on 
this speech. 
Conversely, the Left Alliance was the only party as per this debate suggesting decreased 
military cooperation with both the US and NATO. The Left Alliance argued that Finland 
would become dependent on the United States in the light of the recent procurements, and 
by dependency, the US can ensure that the Nordic states such as Finland will pursue 
America’s interest vis-à-vis Russia for example, in the Arctic region. In addition, as 
argued by Markus Mustajärvi, NATO’s increased proximity in the Baltic Sea region 
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increases tensions and contributes to the accumulation of military power in the region, 
which is the reason why Finland should avoid partnership with NATO, “The report states 
numerous times that NATO’s increased presence has a stabilising effect. Just as well, we 
can claim that it creates instability. The accumulation of military power and general 
armament increase tensions in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic region.”23 (Finnish 
Parliament, 2020). 
As per the coding frame, there also exists a third type of opinion, maintaining the current 
level of cooperation with the Nordic states, the US and NATO. The codes of this category 
were dominated by the centre-left parties, consisting of Social Democrats, the Green 
League, the Left Alliance, Centre Party, but there were also a few codes by Christian 
Democrats and the National Coalition Party. The centrality of the speeches’ arguments 
included that it is good to continue the cooperation between Sweden and Finland as both 
countries are non-aligned and that the countries have become natural pillars in each 
other’s security thinking.  
In terms of maintaining military collaboration with NATO, the Green League and 
Christian Democrats characterised this as a mutually beneficial and important 
partnership. In more specific, Christian Democrats highlighted the need to be involved in 
different multilateral organisations as such, because they ensure stability and peace in 
over-all terms, meaning that Finland benefits from this as well. When it comes to 
partnership with the US, codes were assigned to the speakers from the Green League, the 
National Coalition Party and Centre Party. The Green League and Centre Party argued 
that the partnership with the US is meaningful because these two countries share common 
values and think alike. In fact, they saw the common values as the foundation for the 
countries to collaborate. The National Coalition Party toned that despite the current state 
of the Finnish NATO membership topic, cooperation with the United States is essential 
and must be continued. 
 
 
23 “Selonteon useammassa kohdassa todetaan, että Naton lisääntynyt läsnäolo monilla alueilla vakauttaa 
tilannetta. Aivan yhtä hyvin voi sanoa, että se synnyttää epävakautta. Sotilaallisen voiman kasaaminen ja 
varustelukierre lisäävät jännitteitä niin Itämerellä kuin arktisella alueella.” (Finnish Parliament, 
2020). Translated from Finnish by the author. 
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National military capabilities 
The last topic of the debate covered national military capabilities. Centre Party underlined 
the need to increase national military capabilities. Members of the party argued that 
Finland needs to increase its defence capabilities due to the turbulence in world politics 
caused by the great power rivalry. Among others, Finland must develop its cybersecurity 
competence and complete the jet fighter and navy procurements to increase the country’s 
defence. 
In opposition to this, the Left Alliance was the only party whose statements could be 
considered under the category of decreased national military capabilities. Namely, the 
Left Alliance saw many downsides with the planned procurements. Firstly, they would 
provide little extra value in terms of the power balance vis-à-vis Russia, and secondly, 
they would contribute to the general militarisation and increased tensions of the region, 
which would thereby decrease Finnish security. 
The most extensive section in the national military code of this debate was the ‘maintain 
course’. Here, there existed various opinions from the Left Alliance, Social Democrats, 
Centre Party and the Finns Party. The speeches of the category had the same focus that 
Finnish security is largely based on self-defence capabilities which in turn consists of 
conscription and reserve-based army. In more detail, the Finns Party tended to talk about 
self-defence as a pillar among the others, constituting the Finnish defence, while other 
parties assigned higher importance to the fact itself that Finland should continue to have 
trustworthy defence forces. 
4.2 Analysis of the Finnish debate 
First of all, it can be said that the parties in the Finnish parliament had many division lines 
and some statements were even controversial, meaning that members of a single party 
had different opinions, and not everyone followed their party lines. Hence, there was 
some divergence of opinion within the parties themselves. On the other hand, some parties 
held relatively constant line in their positions, such as the National Coalition Party, 
Christian Democrats, the Swedish People's Party of Finland and the Left Alliance. In 
addition, it seems that there is no consensus about the nature of the threat either. Some 
parties saw that Finland must become a member of NATO to mitigate the risks derived 
from the deteriorated security environment. Other parties saw the possible deviation from 
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the orthodox non-alignment as the biggest security threat for Finland, mainly the speakers 
from the Left Alliance and Social Democrats.   
NATO membership 
It can be said that the largest topic at stake was the NATO membership which also 
stimulated the most vigorous debate among the parties (and to some extent within the 
parties, as mentioned), and most of the members of parliaments (MP) had a strong 
position on this topic. Since the first debate, the National Coalition Party and the Swedish 
People's Party of Finland have expressed their support for the NATO-option and favoured 
Finnish membership in NATO, as both parties had concluded a pro-membership position 
earlier24. Both parties suggested that Finland should develop a plan to join the Alliance, 
arguing that NATO is the backbone of European security, and a membership will also 
provide security guarantees for Finland. It was also suggested that Finland should act pro-
actively and join the Alliance when the situation does not require urgent action, instead 
of attempted to join NATO amid a potential crisis when there would be the greatest need 
for NATO’s security guarantees.  
The NATO debate was also related to the question of threat perception. All pro-NATO 
speeches saw that threat was caused by the changes in the security environment where 
Finland is located, implying that the environment itself has become somewhat less secure. 
It was perhaps best brought up by Pauli Kiuru (National Coalition Party), who argued that 
the events in Ukraine should be taken as a warning example of this shift. Hence, Russia’s 
increased aggressiveness initiated a change in threat perception, and to mitigate the 
impact of the deteriorated security situation, Finland should opt for NATO membership.  
The second group of parties can be called the so-called doubters who either provided a 
mixed position between 2016 and 2020 or argued that a NATO-option is something that 
Finland should have, but for some other reason do not support the membership at the 
moment. The Finns Party is a good example in this regard, whereas, in the first debate in 
2016, members of the party expressed opinions of opposing NATO membership but 
supported the idea of NATO-option. In comparison, in the 2020 debate, the Finns Party 
did not express any anti-membership views. Instead, all their speeches of NATO 
 
24 The Swedish People's Party of Finland opted for this quite recently before the first debate, in June 2016 
(de Fresnes & Harala, 2016). 
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membership were categorised as ‘mixed position on NATO membership’, whereas the 
tone of talking about the potential membership left an impression that the Finns Party 
would not mind if Finland would become a member of NATO. Hence, the Finns Party 
was gradually changing their perception towards NATO membership but did not express 
any pro-membership view.  
Another type of doubters was represented by Centre Party and the Green League, whose 
members expressed a wide range of opinions about the membership. There seemed to be 
no unity in the parties, as some speakers strongly opposed the idea of NATO membership 
and expressed NATO criticism. Other members highlighted the importance of NATO 
membership and cooperation with NATO, despite preferring that Finland was to be non-
aligned. Interestingly, the highest difference seemed to be between the members of higher 
position (such as ministers) who were more pragmatic and had a softer tone regarding 
NATO versus some other members, who tended to be more pessimistic in relation to 
NATO.  In addition, none of the Christian Democrats’ speeches could be labelled as pro- 
or against NATO membership, though the party tends to represent the doubters/mixed 
group. This was illustrated by the fact that none of the party-members took any particular 
stand on the NATO membership nor NATO-option per se but expressed support for 
increased cooperation with NATO.  
The last group of the parties were the firm opposers of NATO membership, represented 
by the Left League and Social Democrats. Both parties remained critical towards NATO 
(but also towards the US, as elaborated down below) and strongly opposed the idea of a 
Finnish NATO membership. However, neither did they advocate the NATO-option. 
Furthermore, the fiercest opposers of NATO membership also perceived threat differently 
from the ones supporting NATO membership, whereas possible deviation from the 
traditional line of non-alignment was perceived as a major threat for Finland. The most 
common argument was that by becoming militarily aligned, Finland enters the great 
power rivalry and might become a target itself (Satu Taavitsainen, Social Democrats).  
Hence, the Left Alliance and Social Democrats saw NATO’s increased presence in the 
region as an additional source for the increased tensions and distinguished from the rest 
of the parties by their different understanding of threat perception. In fact, their position 
can be seen as an instance of post-Finlandisation, as introduced earlier by Rusi. For 
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example, traces of post-Finlandisation can be noticed when examining their arguments 
and overall tone regarding NATO and the US. The clearest example concerns the logic 
behind non-alignment, whereas both, the Left Alliance and Social Democrats, argued that 
non-alignment is necessary in order to exclude the possibility that Finnish territory could 
be used against any other state. Both parties made it also clear that Finland should seek 
to uphold good relations with all of its neighbours, despite the circumstances, and as 
argued by Markus Mustajärvi, Finland should know its place based on history: “Finland 
should remember its history, know its place in Europe and practice foreign policy in a 
way that that takes these two facts into consideration.”25 (Finnish Parliament, 2016). 
These statements have a relatively high match with the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine, 
where Finland had to perform its foreign policy in a view that would keep the Soviet 
Union satisfied. 
Military cooperation 
One aspect that enjoyed all parties’ support was the importance of Sweden as an ally, 
even though the Left Alliance’s opinion noted the importance but did not suggest an 
increase in this. However, this opinion was repeated from debate to debate, and can be 
highlighted as one of the central elements in the Finnish security debate. Parties stressed 
Sweden as a natural ally of Finland, and most parties argued that there should not be made 
any limits of how far this partnership can develop. It seems that for many parties in the 
Finnish parliament, Sweden is important both physically and mentally, indicating that 
Sweden constitutes an important pillar of Finnish security thinking. 
Cooperation with NATO and the US also enjoyed the support of the majority. All parties 
except the Left Alliance and some members of the Green League and Social Democrats 
argued that partnership with both actors should be maintained and/or increased. It seems 
that the question here followed similar logic as it was with the case of the NATO debate. 
However, the left-wing parties tended to be less enthusiastic about this cooperation, and 
parties did not always follow the same line. Additionally, members of the Left Alliance 
believed that NATO is made for protecting the interests of the United States. In more 
specific, small states, such as Finland, will be only used as tools to pursue America’s 
 
25 “Suomen kannattaisi muistaa oma historiansa, tietää paikkansa Euroopassa ja harjoittaa tervettä 
kansallista edunvalvontaa.” (Finnish Parliament, 2016). Translated from Finnish by the author. 
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interests vis-à-vis Russia, whereas statements as the latter match with the narratives 
pursued by Russia.  
National military capabilities 
As it was the case for military cooperation, there seemed to be greater unity about national 
military capabilities among the parties than it was the case with NATO membership. Most 
parties supported increasing the national military capabilities. The discussion revolved 
around two significant procurements of navy vessels and new jet fighters. Despite the 
high price, most parties were supporting this. It became clear from the debates that 
credible defence capabilities were yet another fundamental component in the Finnish 
security-related identity, as brought up by Pajunen and Järvenpää in the previous literature 
chapter.  
When it comes to the opposition of increasing the military capabilities, the biggest 
challenger of this policy was the Left Alliance, and to a lesser extent the Green League. 
Both parties argued that military spending cannot be disproportionate in relation to the 
state budget and that the major procurements should be cancelled. Speakers from both 
parties argued that the armament of the region does not benefit anyone. It can be said that 
this opinion might not be related to the fact that these parties would like to see the Finnish 
military capabilities decreased. Instead, it might be that these parties expressed such 
opinions because of ideological reasons such as more funds for welfare (as argued by the 
Left Alliance), and that increase in military budget undercovers the failed foreign policy 
on other fronts (as argued by the Green League). 
4.3 Post-Crimea security debate in the Swedish parliament 
4.3.1 Power dynamics of the Swedish parties during the debates 
Sweden has had a red-green government led by Stefan Löfven (Social Democrats) since 
2014, and the coalition has been established between Social Democrats and Green Party. 
After both general elections, in 2014 and 2019, a minority cabinet was formed, meaning 
that the coalition has had to count on votes outside the coalition, mainly from the Alliance 
parties in return for certain Alliance’s demands regarding the state budget (Sverigesradio, 
2014). This has caused a situation where the coalition, mainly the Prime Minister (PM) 
party, has had to somewhat balance between the opinion of parties supporting the 
58 
 
minority cabinet and coalition’s own line. All of this was even noted even during the 
debates, where the coalition and the Alliance were more or less on the same page, but 
Social Democrats as the PM party still had to advocate the government’s choices. 
What is general for the Swedish parties’ power dynamic during the past decade is that 
two major parties, Social Democrats and Moderates, have lost seats to the smaller parties. 
Perhaps most vividly, Swedish Democrats increased their share of seats from 49 seats 
during the first two debates to 62 seats during the last debate (Swedish Election Authority, 
2019; Swedish Election Authority, 2020). The exact number of seats per party of the 
Swedish parliament after the 2014 and 2019 elections can be found in Appendix 5. 
4.3.2 Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020 in 2015 
The current debate was based on the report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence of the Swedish Parliament with the aim to determine a security policy focus for 
Sweden for the period of 2016-2020. The codes of the debate can be found in Appendix 
6. 
NATO membership 
The first examined topic was NATO membership. A pro-NATO stand was expressed by 
two parties, People’s Party (currently the Liberals) and Moderates. People’s Party 
representative Allan Widman raised two arguments. Firstly, Swedish cooperation with 
NATO has already reached a level where it is seen as closely linked with NATO, meaning 
that Sweden is already de facto part of the NATO bloc for a potential enemy. Secondly, 
NATO’s activity is highly influencing the surrounding security environment of Sweden, 
without Sweden’s ability to take part in the decision-making because of Swedish status 
as a non-member. As noted by Allan Widman: “We cannot handle those serious security 
challenges created by great powers such as Russia on our own. As a member of NATO, 
we could have influence – we could have had a voice around the table, instead of waiting 
for the decision outside the room, whilst decision about international operations are 
being made, as it has been for years.“26 (Swedish Parliament, 2015). On the other hand, 
Moderates stressed that the changed nature of security requires new means from Sweden, 
 
26 “Vi klarar inte att på egen hand anta allvarliga säkerhetsutmaningar från stormakter som till exempel 
Ryssland. Som medlemmar av Nato hade vi fått ett inflytande - vi hade fått en röst vid bordet i stället för 
att, som under många år av internationella operationer, få vänta ute i hallen på att ett besked ska 
komma.” (Swedish Parliament, 2015). Translated from Swedish by the author. 
59 
 
and it is, therefore, justified for Sweden to initiate a clear NATO debate, whereas 
Moderates see NATO membership as something necessary to pursue. 
The opponents of the membership consisted of Swedish Democrats, Left Party, Green 
Party and Social Democrats. Social Democrats and Swedish Democrats tended to argue 
that Sweden should not deviate from its traditional position on non-alignment, as this 
principle has kept Sweden safe for more than two centuries. Left Party and Green party 
stressed the consequences of a possible NATO membership. Left Party argued that 
Sweden would lose its sovereign security decision-making, and secondly, NATO is seen 
as a nuclear alliance, which goes against the self-image of Swedish values. Green Party 
suggested that NATO membership would, in fact, decrease Swedish security, as Sweden 
may become a battleground in a case of war. Additionally, Swedish membership in 
NATO would be taken as a provocation by some forces in Russia, and Sweden would 
also be required to host nuclear weapons on its soil. 
A mixed position on this issue was presented by the members of Centre Party, Christian 
Democrats and some members of Social Democrats. Centre Party and Christian 
Democrats believed that NATO membership is something that needs some clarifications 
and suggested that additional examination is required before reaching any conclusion. 
Anna-Leena Sörenson (Social Democrats) argued that Sweden should align its position 
with Finland in this question, and that any movement towards NATO must have a large 
support by the people shown by a majority-vote by a referendum. 
Military cooperation 
The second subject under the focus was military cooperation. Increased military 
cooperation within the Nordics was supported by most the Swedish parties, while Finland 
was the most popular actor brought up in this context. For example, Swedish Democrats 
suggested that Sweden should create a military alliance with Finland, as it would be a 
mutually beneficial project. Moderates and Centre Party expressed the need to coordinate 
foreign policy moves, such as possible NATO membership, with Finland. 
Moderates and Christian Democrats suggested intensified cooperation with NATO and 
the US. They pointed out that both actors are already considered as parts of the Swedish 
security thinking, and it will benefit Swedish security to develop these partnerships even 
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further. While there were no codes interfiled as ‘decrease in military cooperation with the 
US’, Left Party argued for a decreased cooperation with NATO. This stand was motivated 
by the belief that the current partnership is already undermining Swedish security. In more 
specific, Left Party opposed that Swedish land is used for joint exercises with NATO and, 
as a part of this, urged the government to cancel the Host Nation Support agreement. 
Maintaining the current military partnership with all three actors was supported 
exclusively by Social Democrats. Maintaining the cooperation with the Nordic states was 
justified because different types of Nordic cooperation, such as the Nordic Defence 
Cooperation (NORDEFCO) are increasing the security of all sides and working together 
with partners is upweights acting alone. When it comes to NATO, Social Democrats 
acknowledged that NATO has an important meaning to the security of Europe, which is 
also benefiting the security of Sweden. Sweden chose to partner with NATO already in 
1994 and this partnership is seen as an element in the Swedish defence today. Social 
Democrats also pointed out the good relations between the US and Sweden and that the 
US’ contribution to European security is appreciated. 
National military capabilities 
The third topic was about national military capabilities. Swedish Democrats provided 
multiple arguments in support of this. According to them, it has been the fault of the 
previous governments why the Swedish defence capabilities are currently insufficient, 
whereas territorial defence was almost completely erased. The second argument 
concerned military spending in comparison to GDP. As noted by Swedish Democrats, 
Sweden is the least spending country in the region and should increase its military 
spending to 2% of GDP as done by many of its neighbours. The third point concerns civil 
defence which must be rebuilt as an important pillar of the general defence plan. Social 
Democrats agreed that Sweden must rebuild its military capabilities that were phased out 
after the end of the Cold War. In addition, Social Democrats saw that the country should 
increase the number of women in the army, as gender equality pays off in increased 
defence. Christian Democrats also welcomed the decision that the government re-
established permanent military presence on the island of Gotland. 
‘Decrease in national military capabilities’ and ‘maintain the current level of military 
capabilities/mixed position’ remained uncoded in this debate. 
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4.3.3 Swedish Parliament’s Defence Committee’s report in 2017 
As what can be understood by the title, this debate was largely focusing on the security 
situation of Sweden, the direction of its defence policies, national military capabilities, 
and international cooperation. Codes of this debate is visualised in Appendix 7. 
NATO membership 
Despite the focus on internal affairs, the NATO question become a solid reference point 
throughout the debate. Christian Democrats, Moderates and Liberals expressed their 
support for Swedish membership in the Alliance. In terms of motivating such conclusion, 
Moderates argued that despite the good partnership with NATO, Sweden is lacking the 
security guarantees of what a full membership would encompass. In other words, it would 
be only a technical nuance to become a member of the Alliance in real terms, as Sweden 
would already be compatible with the NATO standards. Liberals’ argument had similar 
roots. They claimed that for a potential enemy, e.g., Russia, Sweden is de facto a NATO 
partner, which means that Sweden is considered a part of NATO without actually having 
NATO’s security guarantees. Christian Democrats pointed out that without membership, 
Sweden cannot have a say in NATO’s decision-making. 
The opposition to Swedish NATO membership consisted of Left Party, Social Democrats, 
Swedish Democrats and Green Party. Social Democrats favoured dialogue and 
cooperation with external actors. However, when it came to NATO, Social Democrats 
saw that partnership does not presuppose membership, and they did not see the need to 
join the Alliance. Left Party and Green Party stressed the importance of stability and 
farsightedness of Swedish security, which is the reason why Sweden should stick to non-
alignment. In addition, Left Party saw the membership as a danger to Swedish security, 
as Swedish NATO membership increases the risk that Sweden would be forced to become 
involved in a conflict for foreign matters elsewhere. Swedish Democrats also stressed the 
importance of non-alignment and claimed that Sweden would become involved in the 
rivalry of great powers by NATO membership. Jan R Andersson (Moderates) argued that 
in case of a conflict between NATO and Russia, Sweden could not stay neutral and would 






The next topic was about external military cooperation. Christian Democrats, Social 
Democrats, and Swedish Democrats felt it necessary to point out the need to increase 
military cooperation with the Nordic states, especially with Finland. The main argument 
was that it is complicated to enhance security alone. As argued by many, Finland is an 
excellent partner to develop cooperation with as it is similar to Sweden in many ways, 
most notably by being non-aligned in this context. Roger Richtoff (Swedish Democrats) 
went even further and suggested that a military alliance could be formed between the two 
states. In relation to increased cooperation with NATO, Jan R Andersson (Moderates) 
spoke on behalf of the Alliance parties and said that cooperation with NATO must be 
deepened to become a member of the Alliance eventually. ‘Increase in military 
cooperation with the US’ code was not detected in the speeches. 
In relation to decreasing cooperation with NATO, only Left Party expressed such view. 
According to them, Sweden should not take part of NATO’s initiatives, such as the 
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom27). According to Left Party, 
the purpose of StratCom is to spread NATO’s lies and rumours, and Sweden should not 
take part in such propaganda. Stig Hendriksson (Left Party) noted that: “Swedish 
membership makes Sweden an active part of NATO’s work of propaganda and 
disinformation campaigns.”28 (Swedish Parliament, 2017). Codes of decreased 
cooperation with the US and Nordic states were not applicable to this debate. 
Social Democrats were the only party arguing for maintaining the current level of 
cooperation with NATO. For instance, according to Social Democrats, Sweden took part 
in StratCom initiative in order to collaborate with like-minded states. Also, Social 
Democrats did not see any controversy in having good ties with NATO, while staying 
outside of the Alliance. Jan R Andersson (Moderates) argued for upholding the good 
bilateral relationship with the US. 
 
 
27 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence is a Riga-based NATO-accredited 
communication organisation for enhancing communication between the Allied states (Stratcom, n.d.). 
28 “Ett svenskt medlemskap gör att Sverige blir en aktiv part i Natos propagandaarbete och 
desinformationskampanjer.” (Swedish Parliament, 2017). Translated from Swedish by the author.  
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National military capabilities 
The last dimension includes codes of national military capabilities. In the column of 
increasing national military capabilites, all parties were represented except Left Party. 
The most popular suggestion to increase the national military capabilities was to raise 
funding. As noted by many speakers, Swedish military expenses were relatively low, and 
parties suggested to increase financing by figures (11 billion SEK by Centre Party, 4 
billion SEK by Swedish Democrats), or as Liberals and Christian Democrats argued, 
Sweden should aim to reach the 2% GDP margin. In addition, Christian Democrats and 
Moderates suggested increasing the capabilities in the cybersecurity domain, whereas 
Swedish Democrats suggested increasing the number of people in the conscription. 
Hence, it was common for all parties represented in this category that funding must be 
increased, one or the other way. 
The only party arguing against an increase in the military defence capabilities was Left 
Party. They backed their opposition to increasing national capabilities with the claim that 
other parties justify the need for armament by the Russian threat, which would 
simultaneously aim Swedish course towards NATO membership. 
Only one statement was considered suitable for the category of maintaining the current 
level of military capabilities – Social Democrats noted that a lot had already been done 
to increase Swedish military capabilities. As an example, Mattias Ottosson (Social 
Democrats) remarked that the Swedish coastal guard has been strengthened, and there are 
permanent military units on the island of Gotland. 
4.3.4 Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025 in 2020 
The last Swedish debate took place in 2020 and was similar to the first Swedish debate. 
Here, the aim was again to debate the direction of the Swedish security politics for 2021-
2025. Codes of the debate can be accessed in Appendix 8. 
NATO membership 
A clear pro-NATO stand was taken by Moderates, Centre Party, Christian Democrats and 
Liberals. All the parties agreed that Swedish NATO membership would increase the 
country’s security position, as NATO is the only force that can provide enough security 
guarantees for Sweden in the destabilised security environment. In more specific, 
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Christian Democrats argued that as a member, Sweden would have better opportunities 
to take part and coordinate the crisis-time planning between NATO and itself. In addition, 
Christian Democrats and Centre Party acknowledged that Swedish NATO membership 
is not only important for Sweden. This decision will also increase the security of the Baltic 
states as Swedish territory provides an essential corridor for transport if NATO needs to 
assist the three Baltic states. 
Opposition to NATO membership was expressed by the members of Social Democrats, 
Left Party, Green Party and one member of parliament (MP) from Swedish Democrats. 
The main message was that Sweden should stay non-aligned as this doctrine has been 
beneficial for Sweden. In more specific, The Swedish Democrats’ MPs noted that despite 
supporting a NATO-option, the party had not altered its decision when it comes to full 
membership. Roger Richthoff (Swedish Democrats) also suggested that if the Baltic Sea 
became an inland sea for NATO, it would not contribute to the political instability of the 
region. Social Democrats and Left Party argued that if Sweden declared a NATO-option, 
it would leave a false impression of Swedish non-alignment to the broader public. 
Furthermore, both parties were afraid that a Swedish declaration of NATO-option would 
be just a step closer to the actual NATO membership, which both parties oppose. As 
argued by Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence, Social Democrats): “To alter our security 
policy doctrine with the NATO-option would be a beginning of a sliding – I feel that it 
will not be enough for Moderates, Christian Democrats and other such parties, after this 
there will come another demand, and another. This is eventually about NATO 
membership.”29 (Swedish Parliament, 2020). In addition, Left Party expressed a view that 
Swedish independent decision-making will be curbed by this membership, as it has 
happened due to the membership in the EU. 
Mixed position regarding NATO membership was almost entirely dominated by the 
Swedish Democrats’ speeches. Together with one opinion of Centre Party, the underlying 
argument was that NATO-option does increase the opportunities of Swedish security 
politics. Swedish Democrats also argued that a Swedish NATO-option would synchronise 
 
29 “Att däremot börja ändra den säkerhetspolitiska doktrinen, där detta med Nato-optionen är början på 
en glidning - jag ser inte att det är nog för Moderaterna, KD och vilka partier det nu är, utan sedan kommer 
nästa och nästa igen. Detta handlar ytterst om Natomedlemskap.” (Swedish Parliament, 2020). Translated 
from Swedish by the author. 
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the country’s position to what Finland currently has. Furthermore, if any change in the 
NATO questions should emerge, potential membership should be considered in parallel 
with Finland. Björn Söder (Swedish Democrats) also noted that by taking the NATO-
option, Sweden takes higher responsibility to meet the NATO standards when it comes 
to military expenses. 
Military cooperation 
Again, the second topic as per the coding frame was about military cooperation. Here, 
numerous parties suggested that partnership should be increased, especially with Finland. 
Swedish Democrats, Moderates Centre Party, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
all argued for this option. Once again, the main suggestion of the Swedish Democrats was 
to form a military union with Finland. According to their logic, Finland is in so many 
ways similar to Sweden, in addition to the geopolitical location, that such a close military 
union would be possible. In addition, Swedish Democrats, Centre Party and Christian 
Democrats brought up another reason for increased cooperation. This time, Sweden 
should seek to harmonise its position with Finland in relation to NATO, and possibly 
move on with the membership question together with Finland. As argued by Björn Söder 
(Swedish Democrats): “NATO-option includes that Sweden and Finland harmonise their 
stand in relation to the NATO question, which additionally brings us closer and signals 
our willingness to increase cooperation…”30 (Swedish Parliament, 2020).  
Hence, all the parties stressed that it is good to act together when approaching the NATO 
matter. Centre Party argued that partnership with Finland is not enough and believed that 
cooperation should be increased with other actors as well, such as the US, Great Britain, 
Norway and Denmark. Social Democrats, on the other hand, argued for increased 
cooperation with NATO and the US, claiming that NATO is the most natural partner for 
Europe in terms of security. According to Ann Linde (Social Democrats), bilateral 
partnership with the US has always been important for Sweden, and Sweden is seeking 
to improve this relationship. 
 
30 “Nato-optionen innebär också att vi nu harmoniserar Sveriges och Finlands inställning till 
handlingsfrihet I Natofrågan, vilket innebär ett ytterligare närmande och signalerar en vilja till fördjupat 
samarbete…” (Swedish Parliament, 2020). Translated from Swedish by the author. 
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When it comes to arguing for a decrease in military cooperation, Left Party alone was 
suggesting this in relation to the US and NATO. According to Left Party, the United 
States is not a credible partner for Sweden, whereas the US has reportedly carried on 
espionage on Swedish defence industry companies. The reason for cutting cooperation 
with NATO stems from an understanding that increased NATO presence in the region is 
only fuelling the tensions in relation to Russia. Secondly, such cooperation is 
undermining Sweden’s traditional role as a non-aligned state, and the argument that 
Swedish security is in danger is invalid. The third type of concern was about the pollution 
of the environment and overall harm to economic activity which the trainings with NATO 
are causing in Sweden, for example, in the county of Norrbotten. However, the most 
considerable argument reaffirmed that cooperation with NATO harms country’s image 
as a non-aligned state. A decrease in military cooperation with Nordic states was not 
suggested by any of the parties. 
When it comes to maintaining the partnerships, this sub-category included only ‘maintain 
the current level of military cooperation/mixed position with NATO’ by Swedish 
Democrats and Social Democrats. While Swedish Democrats argued that Sweden should 
use the current framework with NATO for its own benefit, Social Democrats argued that 
the existing partnership with NATO enjoys the majority of the Swedish Parliament, but 
that does not mean that there would be support for a Swedish NATO membership. Codes 
of upholding the current level of partnership with Nordics and the US were not reflected 
upon this debate. 
National military capabilities 
The last part examined parties’ perception on national military capabilities. Here, the 
opinions of increasing national military capabilities were distinguished by the speakers 
of Swedish Democrats and Christian Democrats. Swedish Democrats argued that by 
NATO-option, the country has the responsibility and ability to grow its military budget. 
On the other hand, Christian Democrats asserted that the country should increase its 
military spending to the level of what is seen average in the region, meaning that the 
country should aim to reach the 2% of GDP bar. As per this debate, there were no opinions 
arguing for decreasing national military capabilities. The sub-category of maintaining the 
current level of military capabilities contained codes from Left Party. Left Party argued 
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that to maintain a credible non-alignment position, the country needs to have functioning 
defence forces capable of protecting Sweden from different dangers. 
4.4 Analysis of the Swedish debate 
NATO membership 
Questions of cooperation and membership in relation to NATO caused expectedly most 
emotion in the Swedish foreign and security debates. In overall, the NATO-debate in 
Sweden was characterised by higher volatility compared to the Finnish one, whereas two 
major shifts took place during the debates between 2015-2020. As of 2020, the majority 
of the Swedish Parliament is supporting a NATO-option, and all of the centre-right parties 
of the Alliance bloc are favouring Swedish NATO membership. 
The proponents of NATO membership claimed that a real membership enables Sweden 
to participate in the NATO decision-making because as long as Sweden is not a member 
of the Alliance, Sweden has less influence over it. Secondly, as Allan Widman (Liberals) 
argued, Sweden is currently a close partner of NATO, yet not a member. Hence, in the 
eyes of a potential adversary, Sweden would already be counted as a country belonging 
to the ‘NATO bloc’ anyhow, however, without NATO’s security guarantees. 
Taken together, the pro-NATO camp seems to have an understanding that the nature of 
the security situation makes it self-evident that Sweden will join NATO one day. This 
was reflected in their arguments as well. As Sweden already has substantial cooperation 
with NATO, the pro-NATO parties tended to argue that an upgrade to membership would 
only be a technical nuance and Sweden would have a lot to gain from this ‘last step’. For 
instance, Sweden would have better opportunities to talk along in forming its security 
environment if it was a member of the Alliance.  
It should be also highlighted that Swedish political actors have gradually become more 
pro-membership. During the 2015 debate, only Moderates and the former People’s Party 
(current Liberals) argued for Swedish membership in NATO, and Centre Party and 
Christian Democrats supported an investigation for potential membership. By 2017, 
Christian Democrats had joined the camp of NATO-supporters, and in 2020, the Centre 
Party had developed a pro-NATO opinion as well. 
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The group of NATO opponents has stayed stable without any remarkable shifts in 
between 2015-2020 and is currently composed of Social Democrats, Left Party, Green 
Party and Swedish Democrats, with the small exception of the latter who today supports 
the NATO-option. Therefore, the anti-membership bloc can be divided into two groups – 
Green Party and Left Party, who would like to see a decrease in the NATO-Swedish 
partnership in every aspect. On the other hand, there are Social Democrats and Swedish 
Democrats who are against the membership but support increased relations. Even though 
all of the membership-opposing parties tended to use the traditional line of non-alignment 
as their major talking-point, there are some differences as well. For example, Green Party 
presented ideological reasons to oppose the membership, as their justifications were based 
on anti-nuclear stands, disarmament and environmental protection. On the other hand, 
Left Party can be seen as the fiercest opposer of NATO and argues that by membership, 
Sweden would put itself in danger because this move could be seen as a provocation by 
Russia. Hence, they tended to argue that Sweden should hold a line of non-alignment not 
only for the sake of Sweden itself but also for the region’s stability. 
Surprisingly, Social Democrats did not express any specific reasons other than the 
continuity and tradition of Swedish non-alignment to oppose the membership in NATO. 
It might be that as the Social Democrats have led the country during all the examined 
debates, they needed to justify the cooperation with NATO and therefore could not allow 
themselves to take too critical positions in terms of an actual NATO membership. And 
lastly, the tone of the Swedish Democrats has softened remarkably. While in the first 
debate they claimed that there is no way of Sweden joining NATO, in the last debate, 
they were in a position where they had to distance themselves from the pro-NATO camp, 
as they had opted for NATO-option. 
NATO-option 
The Swedish NATO-debate differentiated from the Finnish counterpart by one additional 
element of debate – NATO-option31. It appears that NATO-option has more symbolic 
meaning than actual practical value in the Swedish debate because parties tended to have 
an understanding that support for the NATO-option can be translated as a pre-step 
 
31 As noted earlier, Finland opted for a NATO-option already in 1994, and the issue did not therefore find 
that much coverage on the Finnish debate. 
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towards NATO membership, even though it does not have to be that way with the 
example of Finland. Nonetheless, NATO-option made its way to the debate, especially in 
the last debate of 2020. For understandable reasons, all the pro-NATO parties supported 
the idea of a NATO-option. However, there was also a notable change that took place just 
before the debate in December 2020. Namely, Swedish Democrats announced in the late 
2020 that they have opted for the NATO-option (Rydberg, 2020). This implied that the 
Swedish parliament had now a majority supporting the NATO-option, which was 
considered as a meaningful development in the Swedish NATO debate and found wide 
coverage in media. Even though Swedish Democrats tried to ease the broader implication 
of their position-change by reminding that the party had not altered its view on non-
alignment, it is yet another indication that some changes are taking place in the Swedish 
NATO debate. 
On the opposite side, arguments against NATO-option by the PM party were noteworthy. 
On multiple occasions, the argument was that a spelled-out NATO-option would leave a 
wrong image of the Swedish NATO question for the wider public. This belief was also 
shared by Left Party, who argued that NATO-option is a hidden pre-phase of NATO 
membership, and such decision would leave a vague impression of Swedish non-
alignment.  It can only be suggested that this argument had an internal dimension as well, 
whereas supporting NATO-option might look like as an unexpected act in the eyes of the 
Social Democrats’ voters. Thus, it can be said that as it was the case during the Cold War, 
reputation and country’s image are still very contemporary points of thought in the 
Swedish politics, especially when it comes to such a sensitive topic as Sweden’s 
relationship to NATO. However, the big difference is that today Sweden is open about its 
relations to NATO, and cooperation is practised transparently. However, one can always 
ask how much about the exact Swedish-NATO relations are classified today. The answer 
to this question remains, however, out of scope for this research.  
Military cooperation 
When it comes to military cooperation, all parties except Green Party supported an 
increase in military cooperation with the Nordic states, especially Finland. In a sense, it 
has been the Swedish Democrats who have been willing to take it to the furthest since the 
first debate. Namely, they have suggested to form a military alliance with Finland, which 
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seems to carry two goals. Firstly, to increase Swedish security and secondly, to provide 
an alternative to the NATO membership. Additionally, Finland was used as an argument 
according to which Sweden should harmonise its politics with Finland concerning NATO 
and opt for a NATO-option, as Finland did 25 years ago. 
When it comes to cooperation with NATO and the US, the picture is different than it was 
regarding NATO membership. There seems to be unity between Social Democrats and 
many of the centre-right parties as they all support upholding and increasing cooperation 
with NATO and the United States. It can be almost said that Social Democrats were the 
biggest supporters of this, according to the debates. Not surprisingly, it is Left Party who 
is against this partnership with NATO and the US, it is alone on this, however. Left Party 
has many objections regarding this cooperation, but most importantly, they argue that this 
cooperation is a hidden method of taking Sweden closer to the Alliance itself. 
National military capabilites 
In general, most of the parties supported strengthening the national military capabilities 
by increasing the military budget. In more specific, many of the parties argued that in 
order to prepare for the NATO-option, Sweden must harmonise its security politics with 
the NATO standards. For example, Liberals, Swedish Democrats, Christian Democrats 
used the compatibility with NATO’s standards as an argument to achieve the military 
spending of 2% of GDP. As a part of this, Swedish Democrats also took the opportunity 
and used this topic to criticise the previous governments (i.e., mainstream parties) for 
running down the national defence of Sweden after the end of the Cold War, whereas as 
of 2015, the Swedish military spending was the lowest in comparison with its neighbours. 
Another aspect which received wide support was the rebuilding Swedish territorial 
defence. The best example of this was the re-introduced permanent military forces on the 
island of Gotland. 
Once again, the only deviating force was Left Party, whose members were expressing 
mixed positions on this topic. While some speakers agreed that Sweden must maintain 
good defence capabilities for having a credible non-alignment, some speakers opposed 
increasing the national military capabilities. The argument was that other parties use the 
Russian threat as a justification for armament and the hidden goal behind it would be to 
put Sweden on the NATO track. 
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4.5 Deteriorated security environment and its impact on the political 
elite’s security policy preferences. The cases of Finland and 
Sweden 
To begin with, some general remarks about the overall character of the Finnish and 
Swedish debates can be made. It seems that the Swedish debate was more clear-cut, and 
division lines among the parties were somewhat more apparent. Even though parties’ 
standpoints were more dynamic and witnessed greater change over time, the Swedish 
parties as entities were more unitary in their views in relation to the Finnish parties. 
Indeed, the Finnish debates witnessed more significant divergence within the parties, 
which was especially evident for Centre Party, the Finns Party and the Green League. On 
the other hand, there was less movement in the positioning on significant issues in the 
Finnish debate, whereas none of the 8 observed Finnish parties changed their stand on 
NATO membership during the period of observation. 
Differences in debate 
When comparing the NATO debate between the two states, it looks like the Swedish one 
was more developed and sophisticated. This became evident, especially when considering 
the arguments of the Swedish proponents of NATO membership. For instance, 
Moderates, Liberals, Centre Party and Christian Democrats not only did assert that NATO 
enhances Swedish security, but their arguments also highlighted the benefits of what 
NATO membership would entail. In this regard, it was mentioned that Swedish 
membership increases Sweden’s possibilities to take part in the decision-making of the 
region’s security, and as Sweden’s interoperability is already on a high level, fully-
fledged membership would be only as a technical nuance. In addition, Sweden is already 
considered so close partner to NATO that it can de facto be considered as a part of the 
NATO bloc by the possible adversary. In comparison, the Finnish NATO debate 
remained rather basic, and the NATO proponents’ arguments were mainly about claiming 
that membership in NATO would enhance Finnish security rather than elaborating in 
specific terms of what Finnish membership would bring along. 
Another specific point that describes the Finnish debate but was less detected in the 
Swedish one was about what was perceived as threat. Some opponents of NATO 
membership in the Finnish debate (for instance, Social Democrats and the Left Alliance) 
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expressed a strong belief that Finland would place itself in danger if it would become a 
member of the Alliance. Hence, despite the deteriorated security situation which was 
recognised by both parties, Finland would be more secured when maintaining its non-
alignment than by aligning. However, similar justifications were also used on a few 
occasions in the Swedish debate, hinting that an understanding what constitutes a security 
threat for the country is somewhat different among the opponents of NATO membership 
of both states. 
When it comes to military cooperation, the Finnish debate demonstrated that Sweden 
plays an essential role in Finnish security thinking, as many Finnish politicians explicitly 
emphasised the crucial role of Sweden in terms of security cooperation. The importance 
of Finnish partnership was also stressed in the Swedish debates, however, with a slightly 
more modest tone. In overall terms, the military cooperation domain was the most similar 
of the examined debates.   
National military capabilities was perhaps a bigger topic in Sweden, whereas it had run 
down its territorial defence after the end of the Cold War and its current territorial defence 
was more vulnerable. The most notable remarks of improving the Swedish defence were 
about extra funding to the military domain, troops deployment to the island of Gotland 
and reforms in the army to increase the amount of people in conscription. Issues 
addressing insufficient defence were not affecting the Finnish debate, as Finland had 
constantly maintained its military capabilities. Hence, the Finnish debate was mostly 
concentrating on the procurements of military equipment and about the general 
improvement of Finland’s defence capabilities. 
Findings related to political parties 
Some important outcomes can be highlighted in relation to the parties themselves as well. 
Firstly, there seems to be a general tendency of the left-wing parties to stick to non-
alignment in comparison to the centre-right parties in both countries. Secondly, both 
right-wing populist parties, Swedish Democrats and the Finns Party, have gradually 
altered their stand towards NATO. While in the first two debates in 2015 and 2016, both 
parties opposed NATO membership firmly, then by 2020, both parties had moved much 
closer to what can be seen as a mixed position on this issue, even though Swedish 
Democrats explicitly noted that they cannot be considered as membership supporters. In 
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any case, there has been some sort of change among the right-wing populists of the two 
Nordic states in relation their perception towards NATO, which deeper roots remained, 
however, unrevealed. 
Thirdly, Swedish parties are on their way to approaching NATO (membership). When 
comparing the debates of 2015 and 2020, it becomes clear that Swedish parties have 
become closer to NATO, whereas all the Alliance parties are now supporting a Swedish 
NATO membership, and there is a majority for a NATO-option (with the help of Swedish 
Democrats). In addition, the biggest party, Social Democrats, are strong advocates of the 
Swedish-NATO partnership but still hesitate to support an actual membership. Also, 
when looking at the Social Democrats’ argumentation regarding opposing the 
membership, only identity-related justifications were detected. In Finland on the other 
hand, the parties did not alter their position on NATO membership during the period of 
observation, as already mentioned. 
One of the main empirical conclusions of this work is that when it comes to NATO 
membership, the examined debates suggest that the Swedish debate is more advanced and 
mature on this issue. As history has shown, individual initiatives are possible when 
considering the possibility of a Swedish NATO membership. If that would be the case, 
this new situation would additionally put Finland in a difficult position, as it would lose 
a member of its current ‘security club’, meaning that such circumstances would 
additionally stimulate a Finnish debate of NATO membership as well. 
Constructed identities of the past still matter 
It also became apparent that constructed identities still matter, which was especially the 
case for the opponents to NATO membership in both countries.  In addition to the 
statement that non-alignment has served the country well, opponents of NATO 
membership had some country-specific reasonings matching the historically constructed 
identities of neutrality. The strongest Finnish opponents to NATO membership (Social 
Democrats and the Left Alliance) used the same arguments as what characterised Finnish 
politics during the Cold War – Finland must stay neutral in order to ensure that Finnish 
soil could not be used against hostilities of any country, and that good relations should be 
maintained with all neighbours. Moreover, Markus Mustajärvi (Left Alliance) made a 
direct reference to history by claiming that Finland should remember the past and know 
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its place as a non-aligned state, as if Finland would be in the same position vis-à-vis the 
eastern neighbour as during the Cold War. Hence, as claimed by Rusi, post-Finlandisation 
is detectable in contemporary Finnish politics in the arguments proposed by the opposers 
of NATO membership. 
When it comes to the Swedish opponents of NATO membership, the best example of the 
past’s influence was detectable in Ann Linde’s arguments during the 2020 debate (Social 
Democrats, Minister of Foreign Affairs). She stated that an open Swedish NATO-option 
would leave a false impression to the international public, meaning that Sweden does not 
want to be considered as a NATO country. Hence, what can be understood from Linde’s 
words, thoughts about a Swedish NATO membership are somewhat incompatible with 
Sweden’s international image of neutrality and non-alignment, suggesting that there are 
still some unsolved ethical dilemmas regarding NATO membership. Thus, for both 
countries, it is especially the left-wing parties that seemed to be attached to the old 
narratives that were dominant in the past. 
Theoretical reflections in the light of findings 
Additionally, it can be also reflected and reminded what does constructivist approach to 
the concepts tell in the light of these results. As constructivist argue, norms and identities, 
in addition to power, are influencing actors’ stand on security. When it comes to states, it 
is often the case that states absorb certain roles that do not necessarily follow the 
rationalist maximisation of the situation. Hence, when looking at the security politics of 
Finland and Sweden, these two Nordic states could have joined NATO immediately after 
the end of the Cold War, or even after 2014 when it became clear that the old east-west 
confrontation has made a return. However, as argued by Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 
attachment to a certain identity can be so strong that it can dominate over the perception 
of threat. Thus, even though Russia has become more powerful, unpredictable and 
aggressive, it does not certainly mean that all domestic actors (different expert groups, 
parties, et cetera) would, first of all, perceive the changed security environment similarly, 
and secondly, abandon non-alignment as part of identity right away. Hence, the findings 
suggest that at least some domestic actors (left-wing parties) are likely to guide from their 
own beliefs and historical memory influenced by identity. 
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On the other hand, as constructivists also note, actor’s interests and identities are not fixed 
and are subject to change. As seen, Finland and Sweden have both abandoned political 
neutrality (by joining the EU) and advocated a military non-alignment instead. Also, 
parties in both countries which do not support NATO membership are willing to deepen 
the partnership with NATO while acknowledging that this might erode their 
trustworthiness of military non-alignment, especially in the eyes of potential adversaries. 
Thus, this research suggests that a gradual identity change is taking place in Finland and 
Sweden, whereas attachment to non-alignment is slowly receding. 
In addition, constructivists argue that threat perception emerges and evolves in a mixture 
of different domestic factors. Indeed, the majority of the parties represented in both 
parliaments are supporting to increase military cooperation with each other, but also with 
the US and NATO. Finland and Sweden have participated in and hosted international 
military exercises with NATO, whereas the most remarkable was Aurora in 2017 when 
NATO’s ground forces trained on the soil of Sweden for the first time. This is something 
that was hard to foresee, for instance, 20 years ago, and can therefore be accounted for 
the altered security situation.  
However, not all parties have perceived threat similarly. The examples of the Finnish 
Social Democrats and the Left Alliance indicated that threat perception is still very much 
subjective and may not be the same for all domestic actors. As brought up previously, 
many MPs from these parties expressed a belief that Finland would put itself into a greater 
danger if it would become a member of NATO. Hence, while the general threat perception 
has increased in both countries, there are some political actors in both states which have 
not necessarily perceived the change in security environment similarly. This means that 
those actors who have different perception of threat, might not agree with the changed 
security policy preferences of other actors.   
How does deteriorated security environment affect the political elite’s security 
policy preferences in a small non-aligned state?  
Despite having some country-specific features, there are some are general trends that can 
be highlighted in relation to Russia’s increased aggressiveness and the threat perception 
of the Finnish and Swedish political elite. One inevitable consequence has been that 
political actors in both countries have started to seek possibilities to strengthen their 
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security position. As observed in this research, change in three domains was detected in 
this regard. 
The first of them is related to military alignment. What was inherent, especially for the 
Swedish debate, was that Swedish (centre-right) parties started to support military 
alignment. This was less apparent for the Finnish debate as none of the parties altered 
their position towards military alignment during the observation period. However, there 
are proofs that, at least on the debate level, deteriorated security environment stimulated 
the NATO debate even in Finland. The second indication concerns military cooperation 
whereas both states started to stress the importance of international cooperation and 
started to find ways to enhance this with like-minded states, e.g., each other, states in 
Nordic, the United States, and other European states. The last point is about national 
military capabilities. The analysed debates proved that national defence received 
increasingly more attention as a result of the changed security environment, and both 
countries were willing to allocate additional resources to maintain and reinforce their 
national defence capabilities. This was especially evident in the case of Sweden, which 




This research aimed to discover how has deteriorated security environment altered 
security debate in two small non-aligned states. To achieve this, the research examined 
the parliamentary debate of Sweden and Finland after the Crimean annexation in 2014, 
which is considered as the most serious and most explicit sign of the changed nature of 
European security. Changes in the security environment have forced several European 
states to critically re-evaluate their self-defence capabilities, including the political actors 
in Sweden and Finland. 
The core of this study was based on the examination of the three security debates of the 
Finnish and Swedish parliaments conducted between 2015-2020, while focusing on three 
themes: NATO membership, military cooperation and national defence capabilities. The 
empirical material of the debates was coded by following the qualitative content analysis 
method, and the speeches were thereafter labelled according to the coding frame. By 
guiding from the findings and to answer the first sub-question, how does threat perception 
change as a result of deteriorated security environment, this study argues that 
deteriorated security environment converts into increased threat perception among the 
political actors, which finds translation in changes of their preferences for security 
policies. Respectively, to answer the second sub-question, what changes does altered 
threat perception evoke in security policy preferences, deteriorated security environment 
increases the political elite’s motivation to approach alliances that are perceived as a 
source of security guarantees, reinforce military cooperation with like-minded actors, and 
it also makes the political actors of non-aligned states to critically reflect on the national 
military capabilities.  
Based on the examination of the Finnish and Swedish parliamentary debate and to answer 
the main research question, how does deteriorated security environment affect the 
political elite’s security policy preferences in a small non-aligned state, this research 
argues that deteriorated security environment has increased the Swedish political elite’s 
support for military alignment with NATO and stimulated the NATO debate among the 
Finnish political elite. The second shift in security policy preferences concerns military 
cooperation, whereas deteriorated security environment has increased the Finnish and 
Swedish politicians’ willingness to seek international cooperation with other like-minded 
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actors, for instance, with each other (Finland-Sweden), within the Nordic, with NATO 
and the US. Thirdly, deteriorated security environment has also made the political actors 
to critically reflect upon the country’s national military capabilities, whereas political 
actors in both states are favouring increased military spending and additional measures to 
enhance the national military capabilities. More considerable changes are taking place in 
Sweden, due to the weaker position of their defence competences in the first place. 
In terms of contrasting the Swedish and Finnish results with each other, this research 
concludes that the Swedish NATO debate is more mature and elaborated than the Finnish 
one, and there is a bigger chance of a Swedish initiative to become militarily aligned than 
it would be for Finland. Similarly, national defence capabilities are a more significant 
concern for the Swedish political elite than it is for the Finnish counterparts due to 
Sweden’s drastic decrease in military capabilities after the end of the Cold War. When it 
comes to military cooperation, the results are similar. Both countries are interested in 
reinforcing their partnership ties to each other, the US, NATO, and other European states. 
It can be concluded that even though the political elite in both countries has altered their 
security policy preferences because of the deteriorated security situation, chances in 
Sweden have been more concrete and rapid. Hence, threat perception among the Swedish 
political actors has been somewhat greater than it has been for the Finnish counterparts. 
Additionally, this research determined that Finland and Sweden have their own 
(historical) roots for the strong attachment to non-alignment. For Finland, non-alignment 
and neutrality were the only options to maintain its sovereignty after the World War Two, 
whereas Swedish neutrality can be seen as a conscious choice which has developed during 
a longer time span. Hence, as neutrality has been part of the security doctrines for so long 
time, it has simultaneously become a substantial part of these countries’ security identity. 
This confirms the constructivist explanation on security, according to which not only 
power determines how actors perceive and think of security. Instead, it is a mix of power, 
norms and identities that make up actor’s approach to security, whereas this study was 
focusing on the identity’s influence on security politics. In fact, absorbed identity can be 
so strong that it can dominate over ‘objective’ threat perception, which was demonstrated 
by the diverse interpretation of the nature of threat and the ways to tackle it. Thus, threat 
is a social construct, and different domestic actors may interpret it differently, making 
threat a subjective matter. 
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In addition, the empirical findings indicated that for both states, it was especially the left-
wing who tended to advocate the old, constructed identities. Hence, despite the 
deteriorated security situation, left-wing parties were more likely to be reluctant to alter 
the grand security positions, such as the NATO membership. For instance, in the Finnish 
debate, the Left Alliance and Social Democrats drew argumentations for non-alignment 
that were used to describe Finlandisation. In Sweden, Social Democrats, Left Party, and 
Green Party argued that alignment is incompatible with (international) Sweden’s image. 
Hence, states absorb roles, and their decisions are influenced by the identities of these 
roles, which was confirmed by the results of this work. Even though Russia’s foreign 
policy has become increasingly risk-taking and aggressive, parties who feel attached to 
particular identities are hesitant for changes in security politics, if it requires substantial 
shifts in identity. However, interests and identities are not fixed and are subject to change. 
One of the conclusions of this research is that Sweden and Finland are witnessing a slow 
shift in identity, whereas non-alignment and neutrality will gradually lose their 
significance in light of the recent security situation changes. Therefore, this research 
concludes that changes in the NATO membership question are likely to happen, 
especially when it comes to Sweden, particularly in the light of the upcoming general 
elections in 2022. As mentioned, all the Swedish Alliance parties have adopted a pro-
membership position, and the right-wing populist party is also increasingly supportive for 
approaching NATO. Hence, considerable changes may have been on hold due to the fact 
that Sweden has not had right-wing government since 2014. 
In addition to the findings related to the left-wing parties and their attachment to identity, 
this study discovered some evolution in the right-wing populist’s approach to NATO, as 
both such actors in Finland and Sweden have gradually softened their stiff opposition to 
NATO membership over time. For instance, in the last examined debate in 2020, both 
parties appeared to more pro-NATO than ever before. Hence, this study suggests two 
topics for prospective research. Firstly, examination of left-wing parties’ attachment to 
(historically) constructed identities. Secondly, if the Swedish and Finnish right-wing 
populist’s increasingly NATO friendly position is part of a wider European phenomenon, 
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Seats in the Finnish Parliament 
After the elections in 2015, the 200 seats in the Finnish parliament were allocated as 
follows:  
Centre Party 49 (Keskusta) seats; Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) 38 seats; National 
Coalition Party (Kokoomus) 37 seats; Social Democratic Party (Sosialidemokraattinen 
puolue) 34 seats; Green League (Vihreä Liitto) 15 seats; Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) 
12 seats; Swedish People's Party of Finland (Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue) 9 seats; 
Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit) 5 seats; Åland Coalition (Åländsk Samling), 
1 seat (Yle, 2015). 
After the elections in 2019, the 200 seats in the Finnish parliament were allocated as 
follows:  
Social Democratic Party (Sosialidemokraattinen puolue) 40 seats; Finns Party 
(Perussuomalaiset) 39 seats; National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) 38 seats; Centre Party 
(Keskusta) 31 seats; Green League (Vihreä Liitto) 20 seats; Left Alliance 
(Vasemmistoliitto) 16 seats; Swedish People's Party of Finland (Suomen ruotsalainen 
kansanpuolue) 10 seats; Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit) 5 seats; Movement 




Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Finnish Government’s 
foreign and security policy report in 2016 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Pro-NATO membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
NATO’s ‘open doors’ policy is important for Finland, because 
this provides an opportunity to obtain membership one day. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
To leave the NATO-door open is one thing. Another thing is to 
actually take a course towards the membership. In this regard, 
Swedish People's Party of Finland is going to take a step 
further and openly declare the party’s position to seek Finnish 
membership in NATO by 2025. By Finnish membership in 
NATO, it can be ensured that Finland would be protected in 
case of war. According to Wallin, this view finds support even 
among the Alliance parties in Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Sofia Vikman, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
As it came out from the report, the government agrees that 
increased NATO presence is contributing to a safer 
environment in the Baltic Sea area. According to the logic of 
the National Coalition Party, this means that Finnish 
membership in NATO would only enhance Finland’s security. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pauli Kiuru, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
The purpose of defence alliances is to defend, and nobody has 
dared to attack NATO. At the moment Finland is only a 
partner-state of NATO, which does not give it the security 
guarantees. This is something that Finland should learn after 







Appendix 2 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pauli Kiuru, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Becoming a member of NATO is a long process and it may 
take years. Therefore, it be better to apply during the 
peacetime not in a case of an emergency. Finland should think 
ahead and act pro-actively. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jaana Pelkonen, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Many of Finland’s friend in Europe are part of the EU and 
NATO, and the Alliance has a central meaning the European 
security. However, the security guarantees of NATO are only 
applicable to NATO members. This is the reason why there is 
no valid argument of keeping Finland outside of NATO. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jukka Kopra, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Discussion about NATO-option is pleasant but it will not help 
when there is an actual crisis. It would be therefore wise for 
Finland to seek NATO membership during the peacetime. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Against NATO 
membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Matti Vanhanen, Centre Partry 
Motivation 
Non-alignment has served the country well, and the party sees 
that Finland stays non-aligned even in the future. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Party 
Motivation 
It is important to realise that Finnish interests are best served 
by staying non-aligned, as it is the way for Finland to stay out 
of military conflicts. By non-alignment it can be assured, that 
nobody can suspect Finland of becoming a source hostile 
military activity. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Party 
Motivation 
Social Democrats do not see any valid reason to undermine the 




Appendix 2 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Krista Mikkonen, Green League 
Motivation 
The Green League is against NATO membership as they 
believe that it would only increase tensions in the Baltic Sea. 
Also, NATO membership would be a deviation from the 
orthodox Finnish security-position and any change in this issue 
would require a wide discussion and a referendum. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
It is important for Finland to stay outside to military conflicts. 
By the current non-alignment this is possible. However, 
membership in NATO would take away this possibility which 
is the reason why Finland should not seek membership in the 
Alliance. It is also important to note that from the Finnish 
security perspective, it is essential that Finnish territory would 
not be used to any hostilities against any other country. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The best Finland can do to stabilise the security situation in the 
region is by staying out of military alliances and by practising 
an active policy of solidity. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Finland should remember its history and know its place in 
Europe. Finland is secure by having good relations with the 
east and west, and this is only possible by staying non-aligned. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Eero Heinäluoma, Social Democratic Party 
Motivation 
Changes in the security situation have been overstressed. 
There is no need for Finland to change its security course. We 
stick to non-alignment and take care of our security on our 
own. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Tuomo Puumala, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland needs to take care of its defence on its own which 
implies that Finland will stay out of military alliances. One 
presumption of course is that Finland has the necessary 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Party 
Motivation 
The position of pro-NATO parties in the parliament does not 
correspond to Finnish security realities. Vice versa, 
membership in NATO would put Finland into greater danger. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Paavo Arhinmäki, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Finland must stay out from military alliances and seek to 
balance its relationships with all neighbours, including Russia. 
Finnish security and foreign politics should be aimed at 
maintaining good relations with all sides which is achieved by 
neutrality. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Hannu Hoskonen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland should realise its geopolitical location. It has always 
had good realisation with all neighbours, with Russia too. 
Hence, Finnish foreign and security politics should not alter its 
course to confrontations. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Johanna Karimäki, Green League 
Motivation 
Finland is already too close to NATO, whereas without 
NATO’s safety guarantees. Green League does not support 
NATO membership nor close cooperation. Finland needs 
friends that are close, for example the Nordic states and the 
EU. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markku Pakkanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland is a non-aligned country, and it is not seeking any 
membership at least in the coming years. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo Soini, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finland upholds the option for applying for a membership 
NATO when it feels the necessity. Therefore, NATO’s open 
doors policy is important for Finland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Matti Vanhanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
It is justified to keep the NATO-option open for Finland. 
Finland has all rights to revaluate its non-alignment position as 
it feels it necessary. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Juha Sipilä (Prime Minister), Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland is a non-aligned country, but we maintain the option to 
seek membership if necessary. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Keeping the NATO-option available and regular reassessment 
of the security situation are important tools for the Finnish 
foreign and security politics. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Aila Paloniemi, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finnish security debate does not need to get stuck on the 
NATO membership. Finland is not going to seek membership 
anytime soon, but it has the NATO-option. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo V. Korhonen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
NATO-option is an important aspect. Finland must have the 
opportunity, regardless of the circumstances, to join NATO if 
it finds reasons to do this. Finnish security and foreign policy 
need manoeuvring room, 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kari Kulmala, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Even though Finland is roughly speaking a non-aligned state, 
it is keeping the NATO-option open. However, no course 
change is expected to happen in the following years. The 
question of NATO membership is perhaps even more related 
to the decisions made by Sweden, as it would be unwelcomed 
from the Finnish perspective to stay alone in vacuum. 
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Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo Soini, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Sweden has a unique position in the Finnish bilateral 
partnerships which is the reasons why Sweden has a central 
meaning in the Finnish security and foreign politics. 
Cooperation is developed on the basis of numerous common 
interests. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Simon Elo, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finns Party argue for an increased cooperation with Sweden as 
it benefits the Finnish security position. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Increasing military cooperation with Sweden can be seen as a 
default option for the Finnish security and foreign policy. This 
must me continued. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Party 
Motivation 
Social Democrats agree that cooperation with Sweden has a 
unique position in the Finnish foreign policy, and it will 
therefore be elaborated even further. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Krista Mikkonen, Green League 
Motivation 
The Green League agree with many other parties that 
cooperation with Sweden is important and needs to be 
intensified. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
Rapid changes in the security environment require even deeper 
cooperation.  Swedish People's Party of Finland welcomes the 
understanding that the need to increase cooperation with 




Appendix 2 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Sari Essayah, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Christian Democrats join the government’s suggestion that 
Finnish, but also the region’s security can be enhanced by 
increased cooperation. For Finland, cooperation with Sweden 
has the highest importance in this regard. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Juha Sipilä (Prime Minister,) Centre Party 
Motivation 
Sweden and Finland have found each other in the security 
domain. As for Finland, the cornerstone of its security politics 
is based on non-alignment. However, this does not set any 
boundaries for the bilateral cooperation between us. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Anna-Maja Henriksson, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
It is refreshing to see that almost everyone is convinced that 
our cooperation with Sweden must be deepened. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party 
Motivation We need to increase and deepen our cooperation with Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jaana Pelkonen, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Even though we value our ability to protect ourselves, Finland 
cannot rely on its own on this question. It is in Finland’s best 
interest to deepen cooperation with Sweden. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with the US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo Soini, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finland and the US are increasing their cooperation. America’s 
involvement in NATO and its military contribution to 






Appendix 2 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Simon Elo, Finns Party 
Motivation 
It is good that cooperation with NATO and the US is 
developed, as it benefits all the partners. For Finland, 
cooperation with the West is especially important due to 
Finland’s and Sweden’s strategical location. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Aila Paloniemi, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland and the US are increasing their cooperation. The US’s 
commitment in Europe through NATO is relevant for the 
Finnish security. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jaana Pelkonen, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
We must continue our military cooperation with the United 
States which means that we should actively participate in the 
military exercises in the region. Only by doing that we can 
ensure that we are capable and ready to receive help if we 
need. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Despite the current stand on the NATO membership question, 
Finland must seek to improve the cooperation with the United 
States 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo Soini, Finns Party 
Motivation 
NATO’s activity increases the security situation in Europe. It 
is important for Finland to maintain and develop political 
cooperation and communication with NATO on regular basis. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Simon Elo, Finns Party 
Motivation 
It is good that cooperation with NATO and the US is 
developed, as it benefits all the partners. For Finland, 
cooperation with the West is especially important due to 
Finland’s and Sweden’s strategical location. 
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Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with the US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Left Alliance does not accept the government’s uncritical view 
towards the increased military presence of the US in the Baltic 
Sea area. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Left Alliance does not accept the government’s uncritical 
view towards the increased military presence of NATO in the 
Baltic Sea area. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Li Andersson, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
NATO’s military presence has contributed to increased 
tensions in the Baltic Sea area. It does not come to the benefit 
to have cooperation with NATO as Finland can contribute to 
the security of the Baltic Sea area by staying non-aligned, as 
this traditional line brings predictability and trust. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Johanna Karimäki, Green League 
Motivation 
I believe that Finland is already too close to NATO, whereas 
without NATO’s safety guarantees. I do not support NATO 
membership nor close cooperation, because we need friends 
that are close, for example the Nordic states and the EU. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Decrease in military 
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Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
Nordic states 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Matti Vanhanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
The Nordic countries constitute one important pillar in the 
Finnish international cooperation. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jukka Gustafsson, Social Democratic Party 
Motivation 
With the cooperation with non-aligned Sweden, we can 
contribute to the security of the Nordic and Baltic Sea region. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with 
NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Matti Vanhanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Partnership for peace with NATO constitute one important 
pillar in the Finnish international cooperation. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Juha Sipilä (Prime Minister), Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finnish cooperation with NATO has a history of a quarter of a 
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Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Matti Vanhanen, Centre Party 
Motivation Bilateral relations with the US are important and appreciated. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Increase in national 
military capabilities 





Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Decrease in national 
military capabilities 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Left Alliance does not believe that rearmament by any actor in 
the Baltic Sea area would solve the issue of increased tensions. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 21.6.2016 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military capabilities / 
mixed position 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Savola, Centre Party 
Motivation 
The cornerstone of Finnish defence is its conscription-based 
army that will fill the reserve in the event of a war. This needs 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Pertti Hakane, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Our current foreign and security politics is based on our self-
defence capabilities. Finnish general conscription and our 







Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Finnish Government’s 
defence report in 2017 





Name and party 
affiliation 
Sofia Vikman, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
The report acknowledges that Finland keeps itself a right to 
seek alliance in NATO. It is in the best interest of Finland to 
keep this option available. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo Heinonen, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
National Coalition Party has reached an understanding that 
even though NATO would increase Finland’s security which is 
the reason why the membership is useful, membership alone 
does not solve the security-related challenges. Finland needs to 
strengthen its own military capabilities as well. 
 






Name and party 
affiliation 
Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party 
Motivation Finland is a non-aligned country. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Kari, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrats are favouring the traditional line in Finnish 
security politics which is based on non-alignment. One 
prerequisite for fulfilling this are strong will and capabilities 
for defending the country. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Kari, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
International cooperation and military trainings will have to 
respect the ground principle of Finnish security which is that 




Appendix 3 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Finland holds a strong security positions thanks to its non-
alignment, as it is not bound to any military alliance. This 
includes not having any commitments to Sweden, even though 
the cooperation may sometimes be beneficial. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
The best foreign policy for Finland is the one that keeps us out 
of conflict, and which assures that Finnish soil will not be used 
any hostilities. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland follows a policy which sees the country non-aligned. 
This doctrine has served the country for a long period of time 
and enjoys people’s support. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Satu Taavitsainen, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
The report says that Finland is a non-aligned state. It should be 
also noted that it will stay this even in the future. Joining the 
Alliance would put us in danger, because we would voluntarily 
make us a potential target, in case a conflict between great 
powers. Also, by joining NATO, we would risk with the lives 
of Finnish men and women who could be sent to war for 
foreign interests in foreign soil. These are the reasons why 
Finland should not become a member of NATO. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mika Niikko, Finns Party 
Motivation 
It is highly unlikely that NATO’s membership would be the 
‘magic key’ to solve the security issues in a situation, where 
there would be a crisis in Europe. Vice versa, it would be 
highly likely, that Finland would be dragged into a conflict if it 
was to be a NATO member in a case of conflict somewhere in 
Europe. 
 









Appendix 3 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
The report states that Finland maintains the NATO-option and 
ensures by its activity that there are no obstacles for eventually 
joining NATO if it finds suitable. 
 




Increase in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Savola, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Our national defence is reinforced by different cooperation, 
but most important, Finland needs to increase its cooperation 
with Sweden for providing a safer security environment in the 
Baltic Sea region. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Finland and Sweden could coordinate their foreign and 
internal security policies which would bring our cooperation to 
a new level. This cooperation could become a role-model for 
other regions within the EU. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
Active cooperation with foreign partner is always beneficial 
for small states such as Finland. Bilateral cooperation 
especially with Sweden has great importance for Finland in 
this regard. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
The changed circumstances in the security environment 
require new approaches. Christian Democrats agree that 
deepened cooperation with Sweden and partnership with 
NATO help to tackle the new threats. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Juha Sipilä (Prime Minister), Centre Party 
Motivation 
Cooperation with Sweden has been a success and we will 
increase our cooperation with Sweden even further. 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Petteri Orpo (Minister of Finance), National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
As a part of our defence’s credibility, Finland must work 
jointly with external partner. Among other, it is important to 
keep up the partnership with the US, NATO and Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Anna-Maja Henriksson, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
The party is pleased to see that government takes the 
cooperation with Sweden seriously, and does not set any 
limitations in this partnership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Antti Lindtman, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrats support the close cooperation with Sweden. 
By such initiatives we can improve the security situation in the 
region. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markku Pakkanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Increased cooperation with Sweden today is a smart thing to 
do. This partnership should not set itself limits and this could 
be taken as far as both countries see it necessary. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo Heinonen, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
I express support to the suggested increase in military 
cooperation with NATO and Sweden 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Even though Finland is non-aligned, we are not neutral. We 
are part of the EU. The report clearly brings out the changed 
circumstances in our surroundings which is the reason why we 
need to keep up and develop our cooperation with NATO, 
Nordic states and the US. 
 




Increase in military 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Petteri Orpo (Minister of Finance), National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
As a part of our defence credibility, Finland must work jointly 
with external partner. Among other, it is important to keep up 
the partnership with the US, NATO and Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Even though Finland is non-aligned, we are not neutral. We 
are part of the EU. The report clearly brings out the changed 
circumstances in our surroundings which is the reason why we 
need to keep up and develop our cooperation with NATO, 
Nordic states and the US. 
 




Increase in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
Active cooperation with foreign partner is always beneficial 
for small states such as Finland. Increasingly deep cooperation 
with NATO is a good sign of this. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
The changed circumstances in the security environment 
require new approaches. Christian Democrats agree that 
deepened cooperation with Sweden and partnership with 
NATO help to tackle the new threats. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Petteri Orpo (Minister of Finance), National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
As a part of our defence credibility, Finland must work jointly 
with external partner. Among other, it is important to keep up 
the partnership with the US, NATO and Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo Heinonen, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
I express support to the suggested increase in military 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Even though Finland is non-aligned, we are not neutral. We 
are part of the EU. The report clearly brings out the changed 
circumstances in our surroundings which is the reason why we 
need to keep up and develop our cooperation with NATO, 
Nordic states and the US. 
 




Decrease in military 
cooperation with the US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The Left Alliance does not support the various partnerships 
with the US. Unfortunately, Finland has been dragged into 
multiple military agreements especially with the US during the 
past years. 
 




Decrease in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The Left Alliance agree with the statement that Finland does 
not allow its territory to be used for hostilities against any 
country. Therefore, it is worrying that the government still 
supports the Host Nation Agreement with NATO that allows to 
use Finnish infrastructure. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Satu Taavitsainen, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Finland and Sweden are close when it comes to security 
thinking. However, Finland should not follow Sweden in its 
decision to allow NATOs operability in its space in a crisis 
situation. Finland is a non-aligned country, and it should not let 
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Decrease in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 









Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
Nordic states 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Olli Immonen, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finland does not have any external security guarantees, but by 
having partnerships with Sweden, EU, NATO and the US, 
Finland makes sure that it has all the odds to receive help if 
needed. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Krista Mikkonen, Green League 
Motivation 
The Green League agrees with the government that one 
country lies in the centre of Finnish external partnerships - that 
is Sweden. 
 




Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with 
NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Savola, Centre Party 
Motivation 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Olli Immonen, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finland does not have any external security guarantees, but by 
having partnerships with Sweden, EU, NATO and the US, 
Finland makes sure that it has all the odds to receive help if 
needed. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Kari, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Finland’s national defence is enhanced by the international 
cooperation, most importantly within the EU and Partnership 
for peace with NATO. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland is a small country and cannot rely only for its own in 
order to be safe. Therefore, cooperation is needed with the US, 
the EU and Sweden. 
 




Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Olli Immonen, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finland does not have any external security guarantees, but by 
having partnerships with Sweden, EU, NATO and the US, 
Finland makes sure that it has all the odds to receive help if 
needed. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland is a small country and cannot rely only for its own in 
order to be safe. Therefore, cooperation is needed with the US, 
the EU and Sweden. 
 








Appendix 3 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party 
Motivation 
The changed nature of our surrounding environment is not a 
matter of opinion. This is the reason why Finland must react 
and increase its national defence capabilities. Credible defence 
is the key for having manoeuvring room in a crisis situation. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finland will increase its war-time manpower from 230 000 
men to 280 000 men. Even though the nature of today’s 
wartime has changed, a country must have military capabilities 
even in the most traditional sense. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party 
Motivation 
For the following years, the government will increase military 
expanses by hundreds of millions. This is needed to maintain a 
credible defence capability. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finland will increase the funding of developing rapid response 
force by 55 million annually. This is needed for maintenance, 
trainings and for other expanses. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party 
Motivation 
The government will initiate a procurement for purchasing six 
new vessels for the marine forces that would be ready to 
operate in all kinds of circumstances in the Baltic Sea. The 
Laivue 2020 procurement has a cost-estimate for around 1.2 
billion EUR. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party 
Motivation 
Recent conflicts have once again shown the importance of 
controlling the air space. The government will prepare a 
procurement for purchasing new fighter jet for the Finnish air 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Olli Immonen, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finns Party support the government by enlarging the war-time 
reserve from 230 000 to 280 000 men, which increases the 
security of the country. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Kari, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Credible national defence is only achieved when enough 
resources are allocated to our air land and maritime forces. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
The suggested procurements, especially the fighter jet and 
military vessel procurements and are significant steps towards 
increasing Finland’s security. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Christian Democrats support the government’s plan to increase 
military spending and the planned procurements that will all 
enhance Finland’s security. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party 
Motivation 
The government will increase the funds of the land forces by 
55 mil EUR in order to develop the rapid reaction forces. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Antero Laukkanen, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Considering the fact that our security environment has 
deteriorated, it is important that Finland takes the measures 
needed to answer these changes. Therefore, it is 
understandable that the amount of money needed for 
maintaining credible defence must grow. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Sofia Vikman, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Even though Finland maintained its conscription apart from 
Sweden, it does not mean that Finland should neglect its 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Markku Pakkanen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
It is good that wartime reserve will be increased into 280 000 
men. This will increase our territorial defence capability 
remarkably. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Timo Heinonen, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
I express my support to the suggested procurements of jet 
fighters and military vessels. This will increase our readiness 
to react in a crisis situation. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Even though the planned investments in military vessels and 
jet fighter are expensive, they are justified. There is a reason 
why experts in the military field have concluded that such 
investments are necessary for our country. 
 




Decrease in national 
military capabilities 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Krista Mikkonen, Green League 
Motivation 
The Green League argue that increasing the military budget is 
always a bad thing and it only signals the unsuccess of our 
foreign policy on other fronts. Greens aim for general 
disarmament as there are no winners in the race of armament. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The Left Alliance does not support the suggested procurement 
of new combat aircrafts with a price tag of 7-10 billion EUR. 
This money is needed elsewhere, especially in the social 
services. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Paavo Arhinmäki, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Finland needs to seriously assess whether it really need to buy 
fighter jets that are approximately 15-20% of the national 
budget. The country needs military forces, but only when it 
has something valuable, such as the welfare state, to protect. 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Kari Uotila, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The suggested increases in military spending will additionally 
mean more resources in maintenance, which means that 
Finland will be forced to cut more in welfare. The government 
should carefully calculate the long-term meaning of the 
planned military procurements. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Li Andersson, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The Left Alliance is a strong opponent of the jet fighter 
procurement, especially due to its high cost. 
 




Maintain the current level 
of military capabilities / 
mixed position 









Codes based on parliamentary debate of the Finnish Government’s 
Foreign and Security Policy Report in 2020 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Pro-NATO membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
We have suggested a membership in NATO for many times, 
and we continue to do so. We see it as a security enhancement 
to the country. Therefore, we also highlight the importance of 
NATO’s open door policy that still gives us a chance to join 
the Alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Eva Biaudet, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
Even though this report does not include any specific stance on 
possible NATO membership, the party sees it vital for Finland 
to be able to freely decide its alignment policies, which 
includes the option that the country will be a member of the 
Alliance one day. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jaana Pelkonen, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
The party sees that a membership in NATO would only 
strengthen Finland’s security. We suggest to our potential 
NATO membership under scrutiny. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Against NATO 
membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The centrality of the Finnish defence lies in our policy of non-
alignment. By this principle, we take care of our defence on 






Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Paavo Arhinmäki, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
As a non-aligned state, Finland can continue to be active in 
reconciliation negotiations, rather than being a side of a 
conflict. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Katja Hänninen, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The traditional line of security for Finland is based on 
neutrality and the Left Alliance says that this should be kept 
this way. One presumption for this is credible national 
defence. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Johannes Yrttiaho, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
NATO is founded to protect the interests of the US, whereas 
the US uses small states to achieve its own goals. NATO is not 
so much about the idea of enhancing international security 
rather than protecting the security of the US. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Tuomas Kettunen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland should stick to non-alignment even in the future and 
not approach NATO membership. We should build our 
defence policies on two major pillars. One of them is Sweden 
and other Nordic cooperation and the second one implies that 
we need to have good national defence capabilities. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Mixed position on NATO 
membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pekka Haavisto (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Green League 
Motivation 
Finland stresses the importance of NATOs policy according to 
which states who fulfilled the stated requirements, are able to 
join the Alliance. Thereby Finland can assure that it leaves 






Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Savola, Centre Party 
Motivation 
The safety of our region is strengthened by our cooperation 
with our friends in Sweden and Norway, but also by 
developing our NATO-partnership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jani Mäkelä, Finns Party 
Motivation 
I believe that this report overestimates the EU as an actor to 
provide security. The reality is that most of the EU members 
are part of NATO which fills the international security 
framework from them. Finland did not follow the path to join 
NATO in the 1990s nor 2000s, and we live with the 
consequences even today. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kimmo Kiljunen, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finland practices partnership with NATO, and we see that the 
door to NATO membership should also stay open, if there is 
need to join the alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kimmo Kiljunen, Finns Party 
Motivation 
The central argument when it comes to NATO membership for 
me is whether Finnish NATO membership increases Finland’s 
security or not. Finland should base its decision by this 
calculation. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pekka Haavisto (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Green League 
Motivation 
Finland most important partner in terms of security is Sweden. 
This partnership will be elaborated even further, as the 







Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
The importance of Finnish cooperation with Sweden and 
Norway has increased, and this is expected also to continue. 
We suggest that maybe there is a reason to think about an 
official agreement for a crisis situation management between 
Sweden and Finland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Savola, Centre Party 
Motivation 
The safety of our region is strengthened by our cooperation 
with our friends in Sweden and Norway, but also by 
developing our NATO-partnership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Eva Biaudet, Swedish People's Party of Finland 
Motivation 
Due to Finland geopolitical location, Finland is exposed to any 
changes taking place in the Baltic Sea region in terms of 
security environment. It is therefore useful for Finland to 
partner up and increase cooperation with other states in the 
Nordic region, especially with Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
It good to see that partnership with Sweden gets more and 
more attention in such reports. Christian Democrats 
understand this and argue for a deepen cooperation with our 
neighbour in this regard, especially due to the volatile nature 
of the security situation. Also, cooperation with other Nordic 
and Baltic States are necessary as well. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Antti Kaikkonen, (Minister of Defence), Centre Party 
Motivation 
Sweden is the most important partner of us when it comes to 
security. I can confirm that this understanding is mutual, and 
deepen cooperation is underway. Support for this partnership 
is also strong among both nations and parliaments. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kimmo Kiljunen, Finns Party 
Motivation 
The report shows clearly why Swedish cooperation is 
important and on what is it based. We have common values, 
have shared history and have excellent relations otherwise. 




Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mika Niikko, Finns Party 
Motivation 
I want to highlight the meaning of Finnish-Swedish 
cooperation in the field of security and foreign politics. We 
share the understanding of our security environment and we 
are in many ways in the same position. This is something we 
should keep and develop further. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Sanna Marin (Prime Minister), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
The EU is currently the most important framework of Finnish 
foreign relations and security community. In parallel to our 
intra-national cooperation, it is important to take the 
partnership with Sweden to new levels and without setting any 
limits. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with the US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party 
Motivation 
Despite the circumstances regarding NATO membership, 
Finland must increase its cooperation with the US. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with NATO 





Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Decrease in military 





Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Johannes Yrttiaho, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Finland has increased its partnership with the US since the 
1992 when the first batch of jet fighter were bought from 
them. We believe that the current procurement is not justified, 
and it will keep us locked under the influence of Pentagon for 
many decades. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Johannes Yrttiaho, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Since the early 1990s, NATOs goal has been to agitate Nordic 
states to secure US’s interest in the arctic region against 
Russia. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The report states that NATOs proximity in the region has 
increase security perception. We counterargue and say that this 
as indeed increased the tensions. Finland should avoid the 
accumulation of military power in the region as this race has no 
winners. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 





Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 




Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
As a part of the wider international cooperation, non-aligned 
Sweden is the closest ally of Finland and we do not set any 
limits to this partnership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Atte Harjanne, Green League 
Motivation 
Greens comprehend the importance of cooperation with our 
friends in the Nordic, but also with NATO and the US. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
Similarly, to Finland, Sweden is a non-aligned country and 
cooperation with Sweden is natural part of our security 
politics. However, in the end, Finland will conclude its 
decisions on its own, as Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Tuomas Kettunen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland should stick to non-alignment even in the future and 
not approach NATO membership. We should build our 
defence policies on two major pillars. One of them is Sweden 
and other Nordic cooperation and the second one implies that 
we need to have good national defence capabilities. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with 
NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pekka Haavisto (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Green League 
Motivation 
Finland will maintain its practical cooperation with NATO as 
can be characterized as mutually beneficial. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Atte Harjanne, Green League 
Motivation 
Greens comprehend the importance of cooperation with our 





Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Christian Democrats support the statements in the report, 
which see the United Nations, the EU and NATO as instances 
which have great importance of maintaining stability and 
peace for Finland. Therefore, bilateral partnership with these 
institutions is seen as important for the Finnish security. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pekka Haavisto (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Green League 
Motivation 
The United States is an important ally of Finland and 
partnership is conducted in various fields, most importantly in 
foreign and security policy. Common interests and value-base 
are boosting this cooperation even further. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Atte Harjanne, Green League 
Motivation 
Greens comprehend the importance of cooperation with our 
friends in the Nordic, but also with NATO and the US. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Hannu Hoskonen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
From the Finnish perspective it is necessary for us to keep our 
relations good with our neighbours. We need to keep close to 
partners, who think alike. Hence, good relations to the EU 
level among the different countries are vital. But also, with the 
US, despite the circumstances. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 







Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Esko Kiviranta, Centre Party 
Motivation 
The nature of the contemporary security can be characterised 
by rapid changes and unexpectedness. Therefore, Finland 
should do its best to stay safe. Finland needs to among other to 
develop its readiness to counter cyber threats, and make sure 
that the country’s self-defence capabilities are being 
developed, by completing the jet fighter procurement. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Joonas Könttä, Centre Party 
Motivation 
It is extremely important to proceed with the major 
procurements such as the Laivue and HX procurements, as 
such investments ensure our national defence capabilities. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Decrease in national 
military capabilities 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Johannes Yrttiaho, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The jet fighter procurement is unnecessary for multiple 
reasons. Firstly, they are not capable of answering the potential 
Russian threat, secondly this would contribute to the overall 
armament, which would only increase tensions in the region 
and thereby undermine our security that way. 
 
Finland Debate Code name 
Date: 11.11.2020 
Government’s foreign and 
security policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military capabilities / 
mixed position 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Finland must take care of its defence, which is developed by 







Appendix 4 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Tuomas Kettunen, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finland should stick to non-alignment even in the future and 
not approach NATO membership. We should build our 
defence policies on two major pillars. One of them is Sweden 
and other Nordic cooperation and the second one implies that 
we need to have good national defence capabilities. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikko Savola, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Finnish defence is based on the nation-wide conscription that 
has credible reserve army and international cooperation. The 
provide a preventive threshold against threats that can 
potentially address our country. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance 
Motivation 
The guarantee of Finnish security is our credible and 
independent defence, which can be achieved by continuity and 
predictability of our main principles, such as the non-
alignment. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mika Niikko, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finnish security is based on our diplomacy, credible self-
defence capabilities and international law. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mika Kari, Finns Party 
Motivation 
Finnish security can be based on four major pillars of credible 
self-defence, different international partnership, good relations 
to Russia and meaningful cooperation in the UN. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Juha Mäenpää, Finns Party 
Motivation 
The most important factor in the Finnish defence is the strong 







Seats in the Swedish Parliament 
After the elections in 2014, the 349 seats in the Swedish parliament were allocated as 
follows:  
Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) 113 seats; Moderates (Moderaterna) 84 seats; 
Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) 49 seats; Green Party (Miljöpartiet) 25 seats; 
Centre Party (Centerpartiet) 22 seats; Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) 21 seats; People’s Party 
(currently Liberals, Folkpartiet liberalerna) 19 seats; Christian Democrats 
(Kristdemokraterna) 16 seats (The Swedish Election Authority, 2019). 
After the elections in 2018, the 349 seats in the Swedish parliament were allocated as 
follows:  
Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) 100 seats; Moderates (Moderaterna) 70 seats; 
Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) 62 seats; Centre Party (Centerpartiet) 31 
seats; Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) 28 seats; Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) 22 
seats; Liberals (Liberalerna) 20 seats; Green Party (Miljöpartiet) 16 seats (The Swedish 





Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Swedish security 
policy focus for 2016-2020 in 2015 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 
2016-2020 
Pro-NATO membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Allan Widman, People’s Party (currently Liberals) 
Motivation 
Sweden’s self-claimed non-alignment does not have reliability 
in the eyes of external observes. Sweden does indeed have 
close relations with NATO today, but it has not taken the last 
mile and become a fully-fledged member. However, without 
membership, there are no security guarantees. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Allan Widman, People’s Party (currently Liberals) 
Motivation 
Sweden is a small country in relation to Russia, and there is no 
way for Sweden to compete with Russia in military spending 
in terms of absolute figures. Sweden should have joined 
NATO 20 years ago already, as Sweden would have had a 
voice in the decision-making regarding issues that have 
concerned Sweden as well. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Allan Widman, People’s Party (currently Liberals) 
Motivation 
Not being a member of NATO has increased Sweden’s 
dependence of NATO. It is clear that NATOs activity affects 
Swedish security, but as a member of the Alliance, Sweden 
has better position to talk along in the issues that affect it. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Karin Enström, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
For moderates it is not the question of whether Sweden should 
be a member of NATO, rather it is how. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Hans Wallmark, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
Sweden is more better off with a NATO membership than 






Appendix 6 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Hans Wallmark, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
Current times are turbulent and subject to rapid changes. 
Sweden needs a new approach to security and an open NATO 
debate is a necessary element of it. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 




Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden should make it clear that it will not join any military 
alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
Sweden’s most important goal in terms of security is to stay 
safe. This is best achieved by having a credible military non-
alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party sees Swedish close military cooperation as a threat 
to Swedish independent foreign policy making which 
simultaneously works against peace and disarmament. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
Sweden should avoid from NATO membership as it is against 
Swedish core principle. NATO is a nuclear weapon alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pernilla Stålhammar, Green Party 
Motivation 
A NATO membership would rather increase the risk for war 
for Sweden rather than to decrease it. Additionally, Sweden 







Appendix 6 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pernilla Stålhammar, Green Party 
Motivation 
Swedish NATO membership would also give Russia even 
more arguments to militaries the region as Sweden would be 
an additional ‘danger’ from the west. Hence, Swedish 
membership could be seen as a provocation by some forces in 
Russia. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pernilla Stålhammar, Green Party 
Motivation 
Swedish foreign policy has a long tradition of peace and 
diplomacy. There is no valid argument to abandon the doctrine 
non-alignment which has served us well under a long period of 
time. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pernilla Stålhammar, Green Party 
Motivation 
If Sweden was to become a member of NATO, it would risk 
becoming also a battlefield in case of war. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Even though the government has evaluated and calculated the 
pros and cons of different partnerships and cooperation, 
possible NATO membership is not on the table and Sweden 
stays non-aligned. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
The current government keeps its line of non-alignment in 
terms of security and does not have ambitions to increase its 
current cooperation to membership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
It has been made clear by the government that NATO question 
is out of the table for this government. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kent Härstedt, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Non-alignment has served Sweden well over 200 years. It will 





Appendix 6 (continued) 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 
2016-2020 
Mixed position on NATO 
membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Centre Party favours a comprehensive investigation of what a 
NATO membership would mean to Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Christian Democrats are waiting for a report where all the pros 
and cons regarding Swedish NATO membership are brought 
up. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party 
Motivation 
When speaking about security, Centre Party will stress the 
importance of having a substantial report about the different 
aspects of possible Swedish NATO membership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Anna-Lena Sörenson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
In case there is a real debate about Swedish NATO 
membership, this must me approach together with Finland and 
secondly, the Swedish people must have a say too. 
 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Anna-Lena Sörenson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
It would be hard to image any government who would take 
any decision regarding NATO membership without consulting 
with the people, through a referendum, as it would be a 
tremendous turn in the Swedish security politics, that has 
followed a line of non-alignment since the early 1800s. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Increase in military 





Appendix 6 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation Sweden should form a military alliance with Finland 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
Cooperation is sometimes necessary and Left Party supports 
increasing cooperation with other Nordic States, mostly with 
Finland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Karin Enström, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
Moderates are willing to increase the cooperation within the 
EU, but especially with our Nordic and Baltic neighbours. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Karin Enström, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
Moderates are willing to start a dialog together with Finland in 
relation to NATO membership, because these decisions need a 
wide discussion and debate. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Sweden and Finland are so close that they their decision are 
inevitably affecting the other state. Vi must follow closely the 
moves Finland makes in these questions. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden has an important partnership with Finland and the 
Baltic states that must be developed further. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Hans Wallmark, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
In case we are in a position to start a real NATO-debate, this 
should be done in close co-ordination with Finland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jeff Ahl, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
It is important to form a sort of military alliance with Finland. 
This move would benefit the security of both states and would 





Appendix 6 (continued) 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Increase in military 
cooperation with the US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Hans Wallmark, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
The bigger and more complicated military cooperation we 
have with the US, the better it is for our security. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Increase in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Karin Enström, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
Swedish cooperation with NATO has been increased in the 
recent years and continues to do in the following years. This 
cooperation enhances Swedish security by every mean. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Karin Enström, Moderate Party 
Motivation 
Sweden should increase its cooperation with NATO as it is the 
best way to increase security in the times of insecurity. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden is even no longer a neutral state, as it is a member of 
the EU and the UN. NATO it an important partner for Sweden 
in terms of security, and it is an important part of Sweden’s 
defence. Sweden must continue to develop this partnership. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with the US 






Appendix 6 (continued) 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
Swedish non-alignment is being undermined with Swedish 
close cooperation with NATO, which is the reason why Sweden 
should withdraw from cooperation with NATO. Left Party 
stands against the Host Nation Agreement. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
Sweden should not be an exercise platform for NATO, 
therefore Sweden should nullify the Host Nation Agreement 
and avoid taking part in other military cooperation’s in 
organizations of NATO and EU. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
Nordic states 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Åsa Lindestam, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
The world is global, and Sweden is not alone. There is a 






Appendix 6 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
NORDEFCO is a security project between the Nordic states of 
Finland Sweden and Norway. We have over 40 joint exercises 
per year. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Åsa Lindestam, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden is a partner country of NATO which enables Sweden 
to undertake joint military exercises with NATO. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Cooperation and inclusion are keys to peace. This is why 
Sweden chose to co-operate with NATO already in 1994. 
However, the debate of our cooperation has now intensified 
since the events of Crimea. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden has a partnership with NATO which enables Sweden 
to take part of different NATO exercises. These are important 
in terms of crisis handling and readiness. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation Sweden chose a line in 1994 to cooperate with NATO. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
It has been made clear by the government that Host Nation 






Appendix 6 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Anna-Lena Sörenson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish cooperation with NATO is important as it for rest of 
the Europe. Sweden uses the Partnership for Peace framework 
in order to meet the demands of the possible crisis situations. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden appreciates the good transatlantic link to the US. 
Thanks to the military capabilities of the US, it is and will be 
an important partner for Europe in terms of security. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Increase in national 
military capabilities 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish sensitive geopolitical location is part of the reasons 
why Sweden must have capabilities to be able to protect itself. 
After the Cold War, Swedish defence was almost erased, 
which was a big mistake. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden has to take responsibility for its security, it has the 
means and funds to do it. There is no excuse not to do it. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Many of Sweden’s neighbours are investing into its security, 
whereas Poland and Estonia over 2% of GDP. Today for 




Appendix 6 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden should increase its military spending to at least 2% of 
GDP. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Åsa Lindestam, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden must rebuild its civil defence which was almost 
vanished as a result of general disarmament. Civil defence is 
an important part of the total defence doctrine. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Karin Enström, Moderate Party 
Motivation Swedish own defence capabilities must be increased. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
The government has reached an agreement to increase military 
spending by additional 10.2 billion SEK and we will re-
establish permanent military presence on the island of 
Gotland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jeff Ahl, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden should rapidly increase its military spending to meet 
the needs of the changed circumstances. Only this way we can 
constitute that Sweden is safer and the potential aggressor 
would think twice to attach Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Alexandra Völker, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden must also pay attention to gender balance in the 
country’s defence. We must get more women to join and stay 
in the national military forces. Greater gender balance will pay 
off in stronger defence. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
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Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 15.06.2015 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2016-
2020 
Maintain the current level 
of military capabilities / 
mixed position 









Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Swedish Parliament’s 
Defence Committee’s report in 2017 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Pro-NATO membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
If Sweden would be a member of NATO, we could coordinate 
its military planning in the region, which would be beneficial 
from the Swedish point of view. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jan R Andersson, Moderates 
Motivation 
There is a general will by the Alliance parties to increase and 
deepen our partnership with NATO with the aim of eventually 
receive full security guarantees by real membership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Allan Widman, Liberals 
Motivation 
We believe that Sweden is still in a no-man’s-land, as we 
cooperate with NATO, but are not members of it. In more 
specific this means that in the eyes of Russia our non-
alignment is void, but on the other hand we do not have the 
security guarantees as a membership in the Alliance would 
automatically provide. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jan R Andersson, Moderates 
Motivation 
We argue that since our cooperation with NATO is currently 
so wide, the next phase of this partnership, that is the 
membership, would in technical sense require so little from us. 
However, the benefits of this move are remarkable as it would 
contribute to the safety of Sweden and the Baltic Sea region. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Christian Democrats favour NATO membership. We believe 
that it always better to be prepared than improvise, especially 





Appendix 7 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jan R Andersson, Moderates 
Motivation 
Even according to the study made by the defence forces, 
Sweden could not stay outside a conflict if it would realise in 
the Baltic Sea region. Apart from many our neighbours, 
Sweden cannot rely on NATO’s military back-up in that case. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Against NATO 
membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
It has been suggested that in a case of conflict, Sweden would 
be dragged into war anyhow. This will happen if Sweden is a 
NATO member, as this is exactly what this membership would 
guarantee for Sweden. Hence, staying out of the Alliance helps 
Sweden to stay out of conflicts as well. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
The Alliance parties seem to suggest that NATO membership 
would dissolve all Swedish security related issues. Left Party 
does not share such vision and see it rather as an illusion. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party suggest that the best security guarantee is the 
traditional one. Sweden does not need NATO, membership nor 
to increase its military spending. Sweden should aim to work 
towards disarmament by using diplomacy, research 
partnership, formal and informal contacts. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden upholds the right to cooperate with any partner and 
Sweden has a partnership with NATO. However, Social 
Democrats believe that the current security line of Sweden of 






Appendix 7 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
In terms of security, it is always good to communicate with 
neighbours. Make friends, not enemies. Sweden and Finland 
are together non-aligned, and it is a good thing. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrats favour cooperation, dialog, and conversation 
with other like-minded states. However, there are several 
reasons why Social Democrats do not support NATO 
membership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrats understand the need to cooperate with other 
states, and this is indeed done with Finland and NATO to keep 
Sweden safe. However, cooperation does not presuppose 
membership. For Social Democrats it important to maintain 
the current non-alignment. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
There is no controversy in having good and tight partnership 
with NATO but staying outside of it. The most important is to 
understand that it is Sweden which has to stand up for its 
security, not NATO, Finland or any other external actor. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Anders Schröder, Green Party 
Motivation 
Swedish foreign policy is based on stability and 
farsightedness, and therefore Sweden should not make rapid 
changes in this field. Sweden’s and the regions interests are 
served best if Sweden continues with non-alignment. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
One of the founding principles of non-alignment is to stay out 
of the games played by great powers. A credible non-







Appendix 7 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Non-alignment consists of credibility, resources and will. 
Sweden needs all of the above to be truly non-aligned. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Mixed position on NATO 
membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jan R Andersson, Moderates 
Motivation 
Moderates argue that the current situation makes it impossible 
to stay neutral or non-aligned. If a conflict between Russia and 
NATO would start, Sweden would inevitably be dragged into 
it. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states (Sweden) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Cooperation with Finland is absolutely necessary and must be 
continue. But Sweden can broaden the scope of partnerships 
for other EU countries as well. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
In addition to the internal dimension related to Swedish 
security, Sweden must work externally as well. Sweden has a 
good cooperation with its Nordic neighbours, especially 
Finland and the Baltic States. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrats understand the need to cooperate with other 
states, and this is indeed done with Finland and NATO to keep 
Sweden safe. However, cooperation does not presuppose 
membership. For Social Democrats it important to maintain 
the current non-alignment. 
143 
 
Appendix 7 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
One cannot build peace and freedom alone. Partners are 
always required. The priority for Sweden is partnership with 
Finland, who is also non-aligned as Sweden. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
To be military non-aligned does not mean that Swedish 
Democrats are not willing to cooperate. Swedish Democrats 
suggests that Sweden stays out of the great power rivalry and 
forms an alliance with Finland instead. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with the US 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Increase in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jan R Andersson, Moderates 
Motivation 
There is a general will of the Alliance parties to increase and 
deepen the partnership with NATO with the aim of eventually 
receive full security guarantees by real membership. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with the US 
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Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
Sweden should cancel its partnership when it comes to NATO 
StratCom. This propaganda structure is only made for making 
up lies and rumours. There is no need for Sweden to participate 
in NATO’s propaganda. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
Nordic states 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
NATOs StratCom is a framework for cooperation for different 
states. Sweden’s participation is a good thing because Sweden 
is it provides a possibility to cooperate with like-minded 
countries whom Sweden has good relations in other fields as 
well. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden will and can have a partnership with NATO which 
does not have to include membership in the Alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
There is no controversy in having good and tight partnership 
with NATO but staying outside of it. The most important is to 
understand that it is Sweden which has to stand up for its 
security, not NATO, Finland or any other external actor. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jan R Andersson, Moderates 
Motivation 
There are many different aspects of security. One of them is 
bilateral partnership which Moderates see as having great 
importance for Sweden. The US can be brought up in this 
regard as a good example of this. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Allan Widman, Liberals 
Motivation 
Liberals have suggested to increase military expanses to 2% of 
GDP, as the security situation does not leave any other way. 
Furthermore, if Sweden continues to be militarily non-aligned, 
this figure has to increase even further. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Jan R Andersson, Moderates 
Motivation 
In order to meet the demands of contemporary threats, Sweden 
must critically reassess its weak spots. One of them is related 
to the cybersecurity. Moderates suggest that Sweden should 
produce a cyber doctrine. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
There cannot be any comprehensive defence without civil 
defence. Swedish Democrats suggest to additionally allocate 
four billion SEK to increase the civil defence readiness. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Allan Widman, Liberals 
Motivation 
Liberals agree that Sweden must invest more money into its 
defence. Therefore, Liberals have suggested to increase 
military budget by 28 billion SEK in comparison to 2015. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Daniel Bäckström, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Centre Party believes that the modernisation of Swedish 
defence forces which has begun must continue, despite the 
huge challenges regarding staff and equipment. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Daniel Bäckström, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Sweden is the least spending Nordic country when it comes to 
security. It is much lower than the neighbours. Hopefully, all 
parties represented in the parliament understand why it is 







Appendix 7 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish Democrats believe that one way to improve Swedish 
defence is to increase the number conscription. While it is 
around 4000 today, Swedish Democrats seek to increase this 
number to 8000. It is important to have enough reserve in 
terms of war-time units. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
The security situation has become worse in the recent years, 
which is the reason why Swedish defence direction needs an 
upgrade. More resources are needed in the defence sector for 
this and the coming years. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Europe has already shown a reaction to increased Russian 
military presence. Many of Sweden’s neighbours have 
increased their military spending and are above 2% by now. 
Christian Democrats believe that Sweden should follow this 
line in order to pay the bill for its security. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
The security of Gotland is central for Sweden and our friends 
for many reasons. It is good that Sweden has re-established 
military presence on the island, but much more is needed. 
Christian Democrats point out that Sweden could have 
permanent artillery and air defence units located there. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden should also standardise its cyber defence. Today there 
is a situation where every state institution has their own 
standard. Hence, there is room for development in this field. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
With the current security provision, Social Democrats will flip 
the curve of the Swedish military from disbarment into 





Appendix 7 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Anders Schröder, Green Party 
Motivation 
Green party is open for discussion of how to increase Swedish 
defence capabilities in the short run. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Jansson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
One of the central perspectives regarding Swedish security is 
the civil defence. It must be understood that without civil 
defence, there is no point of having military defence. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Daniel Bäckström, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Centre Party is ready to set goals for improving Swedish 
security. Centre Party suggests that Swedish military spending 
should reach at least the Nordic average which means that 11 
billion SEK will be allocated during the next four years. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish Democrats have argued for a comprehensive defence 
for years. Swedish military capabilities should not aim at any 
specific threat, for example Russia. Instead, Swedish defence 
should be ready to tackle any type of enemy. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Decrease in national 
military capabilities 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 18.01.2017 
Defence Committee’s 
defence policy report 
Maintain the current level 
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Name and party 
affiliation 
Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrats see, that much has already been done for the 
improvement our security. For example, Sweden has 
strengthened our coastal guard and we have troops on Gotland 
now. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Stig Henriksson, Left Party 
Motivation 
It seems often that some actors are using the Russian threat 
just to justify the need for armament, which simultaneously 






Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Swedish security 
policy focus for 2021-2025 in 2020 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 
2021-2025 
Pro-NATO membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Hans Wallmark, Moderates 
Motivation 
Moderates believe that it is only the NATO membership that 
can give Sweden a comprehensive military protection from the 
uncertainties that are prevailing the Baltic Sea region at the 
moment. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Centre Party also believes that Sweden should eventually join 
NATO as it is the only organisation that can provide us 
enough security guarantees. At the same time, we would like 
to see that Finland is with Sweden on this journey to 
membership. The whole region will benefit from our 
membership in NATO, for instance our Baltic friends. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Sweden’s increasingly close partnership with NATO means 
that big part of Swedish security is based on cooperation. 
Hence, Sweden is closely linked to NATO, yet without the 
real security guarantee. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
For Christian Democrats it is a given fact that NATO is the 
only credible source of security guarantees, at least in Europe. 
Therefore, it is welcoming that Sweden already has a close 
relationship to NATO. However, Christian Democrats believe 
that this should be developed even further, and Sweden should 
become a member of the Alliance one day. By being a 
member, Sweden have would have a better chance to take part 






Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish NATO membership would not only contribute to 
Swedish security. In a case of an emergency, Swedish territory 
would be needed to use to assist the Baltic friends. Hence, 
Swedish NATO membership would have a wider positive 
security impact. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Allan Widman, Liberals 
Motivation 
The truth is that our partnership with NATO has reached such 
a level that there is frankly speaking little room to develop. 
The only way forward is to officially join the Alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pål Jonson, Moderates 
Motivation 
Swedish current line of non-alignment is something much 
more than just the fact that Sweden is not part of any military 
alliance. Moderates’ standpoint is that the current state 
actually does not serve the best security interest of Sweden. 
The current non-alignment would be especially dangerous in a 
crisis situation. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pål Jonson, Moderates 
Motivation 
Moderates do not think that the government should present 
non-alignment as something positive for Sweden, as this is 
based on false illusions whereas it is currently expected that in 
a crisis situation, we would get help from NATO countries. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Daniel Bäckström, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Centre Party appreciates that there is an increasingly greater 
consensus in the Swedish parliament that Sweden should have 
a NATO-option and that a membership in the Alliance is 
eventually needed. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 








Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Despite supporting the NATO-option, it is important to note 
that Swedish Democrats have not changed the general 
perception when it comes to membership in NATO. Swedish 
Democrats do not support a full membership as for today. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party does not share the view with the government that 
Sweden should cooperate with NATO, whose increased 
presence is partly responsible for the increased tensions in 
Europe along with Russia. Sweden should cut all such ties to 
NATO that are bringing us closer to the membership of the 
Alliance. Sweden must stay non-aligned. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party believes that the NATO-option is a wrong way to 
go for Sweden, as it deviates from the orthodox security line 
without any major analysis and wider debate for allowing this. 
This is a wrong way to go as this is yet another victory by the 
forces of pushing Sweden closer to the membership of the 
Alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
Swedish image in the world is closely linked with non-
alignment and that it should be Sweden’s strength to be able to 
state this non-alignment. However, the current direction is 
messing up this image and making it unclear for everyone. 
Instead of taking the NATO course, Sweden should set its 
priority for peace and reconciliation politics. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Janine Alm Ericson, Green Party 
Motivation 
Despite the fact that the majority of the parliament has 
suggested the so-called NATO-option does not mean that the 
guiding principle of Sweden’s defence policy has been altered. 






Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrats see the NATO-option as a step towards full 
NATO membership which is pursued by the Alliance parties 
and Swedish Democrats. Social Democrats see that this would 
be a source of a change in our non-alignment principle and 
Social Democrats therefore against NATO-option. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
It is also surprising how Finland is used by some parties to 
argue for a Swedish NATO membership. Finland has shown a 
firm support for non-alignment and this is expected to 
continue. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden has opted for a comprehensive partnership with 
NATO which enjoys the support of the majority of the 
parliament. However, this does not mean that Sweden is 
seeking a membership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden’s current role and its historical position supports the 
current line of non-alignment. Sweden should not experiment 
with its security politics, which the NATO-option would 
eventually lead to. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Non-alignment has served Sweden well and it contributes to 
peace and security in this part of Europe. Swedish non-
alignment is backed by wide range of cooperation, especially 
with Finland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrat’s perception of Swedish security is that 
Swedish security politics must be stable, predictable and 
should be based on continuity. This is how Sweden can 





Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Bringing parallels between Finnish and Swedish NATO-
option is based on false understandings. The decision made by 
Finland 25 years ago does not constitute how should Sweden 
act today. Sweden can cooperate with Finland regardless of 
the NATO-option. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Social Democrats will stress that an open Swedish NATO-
option would leave a false impression to the international 
public. Sweden should not make too rapid changes when it 
comes to our security. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richthoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
There are many aspects what a Swedish NATO membership 
would entail. One thing would be that the Baltic Sea would 
turn into the inland sea for NATO, which according to 
Swedish Democrats does not support the security and political 
development of the region. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Lotta Johnsson Fornarve, Left Party 
Motivation 
It is important for Sweden to maintain its sovereignty when it 
comes to foreign policy making. Left Party believe that 
Sweden’s ability to conduct independent foreign policy will be 
curbed if the country would alter its non-alignment principle 
and opt for a membership in NATO. Unfortunately, there is a 
tendency to lose this independence since Swedish membership 
in the EU. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Non-alignment has served Sweden well and it contributes to 
peace and security in our part of Europe. Swedish non-
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Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 
2021-2025 
Mixed position on NATO 
membership 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish NATO-option is not controversial according to 
Swedish Democrats. This resolution does not change 
Sweden’s long-lasted doctrine of non-alignment as it does not 
say anything about NATO membership. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
NATO-option is also important because this decision 
synchronises Swedish and Finnish approach vis-à-vis NATO’s 
partnership. As known, Finland has had this NATO-option 
already for 25 years. Hence, by NATO-option, Sweden would 
simultaneously lay the basis for stronger partnership to 
Finland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish Democrats argue that Sweden should explicitly spell 
out the NATO-option today. This means that Sweden has a 
possibly to join NATO if it sees it necessary for the country’s 
security. However, Sweden should not move closer to NATO, 
that is to become a full member, unless Finland does the same. 
At the moment a full membership is not a contemporary issue 
in neither of the countries. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish Democrats are only then ready to change is current 
decision regarding membership when there are clear signals 
from the Swedish people that a membership in the Alliance 
has become relevant. Even if this would be the case, it is 







Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
NATO-option also enables Sweden to concentrate on the 
development of its armed forces. As a part of this NATO-
option, Sweden must fulfil the requirements of what it takes to 
become a member of NATO. This means that Social 
Democrats but also the Alliance parties cannot use Swedish 
defence forces as a milk cow to fund other sectors as it had 
been for decades in the past. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Centre Party sees the NATO-option as an opportunity. It is not 
about membership per se, rather than a possibly for it. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Roger Richthoff, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Apart from the statements in media, Swedish Democrats has 
not changed its perception towards NATO membership. 
Swedish Democrats base their foreign policy thinking on the 
fact that Sweden should seek to align its security politics with 
Finland. It would be even better if Sweden could form a 
defence alliance with Finland. The current NATO-option 
would only help Sweden to achieve this. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Increase in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Swedish Democrats have for years suggested for a defensive 
military union with Finland, as Finland is in a similar position 
in terms of geopolitics and security. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
There are multiple reasons to increase cooperation with 
Finland. Among others, have strong cultural and political ties. 
Finland and Sweden together as a union would increase the 




Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
NATO-option is also important because this decision 
synchronises Swedish and Finnish approach vis a vis NATO’s 
partnership. As known, Finland has had this NATO-option 
already for 25 years. Hence, by NATO-option, we 
simultaneously lay the basis for stronger partnership to 
Finland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Finland is not the only country we increase our cooperation. 
We have the general framework of NORDEFCO which is 
made for partnership among all of the Nordic states. We 
should increase our ties within this framework. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Sweden has strengthened its military ties to Finland, and it 
continues to do that. However, even today, an assault against 
Sweden cannot be ruled out. The increasing need to cooperate 
shows, that even our bilateral partnership with Finland is not 
enough. It is justified to increase cooperation even with other 
actors such as the US, Great Brittan, Norway and Denmark. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party 
Motivation 
Centre Party also believes that Sweden should eventually join 
NATO as it is the only organisation that can provide us 
enough security guarantees. At the same time, we would like 
to see that Finland is with us on this journey to membership. 
The whole region will benefit from our membership in NATO, 
for instance our Baltic friends. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden and Finland have a clear relationship when it comes 
to defence cooperation which is good. However, there is room 







Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
It is important that Sweden and Finland hold a same level 
proximity to NATO. Since both countries have now adapted 
the NATO-option, we can claim that it has increased the 
threshold against the potential aggressor. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Non-alignment has served Sweden well and it contributes to 
peace and security in our part of Europe. Our non-alignment is 
backed by wide range of cooperation, especially with Finland. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pål Jonson, Moderates 
Motivation 
In order to increase security of our region, increased 
cooperation with Finland is a natural thing to opt for. We 
stand behind this partnership and hope that we can deepen this 
even further. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pål Jonson, Moderates 
Motivation 
Our cooperation with Finland should even cover the areas of 
operational cooperation in the crisis and war. It is therefore 
logical that we widen the scope of our partnership in the field 
of security. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Pål Jonson, Moderates 
Motivation 
We can say that NATO-option is the biggest divide between 
the Finnish and Swedish approach to NATO. It is important 
for Sweden to adopt NATO-option as it will harmonise our 
policies with Finland in this regard. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Increase in military 






Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
A strong transatlantic link between the US and Europe is an 
important part of our security. Sweden and the US have had 
good partnership in the field of security for years and Sweden 
will continue to develop this partnership. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Increase in military 
cooperation with NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
NATO is the most important framework for the European and 
America’s. It is therefore natural, that Sweden deepens 
cooperation with NATO through the current frameworks. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with the US 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party opposes the government’s action to increase 
military partnership with the United States. The US cannot be 
taken as a trustable partner in the light of the news that the US 
has carried on espionage on Swedish companies of our 
defence industry. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Decrease in military 






Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
The current motion of Swedish NATO-option can possibly 
cause unnecessary concern and interpret the reality through 
false lenses. There is no need to believe that Swedish security 
and territorial sovereignty would be under risk now which 
means that any steps closer to NATO are unjustified. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party does not share the view with the government that 
Sweden should cooperate with NATO, whose increased 
presence is partly responsible for the increased tensions in 
Europe along with Russia. Sweden should cut all such ties to 
NATO that are bringing us closer to the membership of the 
Alliance. Sweden must stay non-aligned. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party believes that the NATO-option is a wrong way to 
go for Sweden, as it deviates from our orthodox security line 
without any major analysis and wider question. This is a 
wrong way to go as this is yet another victory by the forces of 
pushing us closer to the membership of the Alliance. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party expresses concern regarding the increased military 
training in the region of Norrbotten, whereas increasingly 
bigger exercises have taken place within the partnerships in 
NATO, Permanent Structured Cooperation (Pesco) and the 
EU. This has serious consequences to the local environment 
and economic activity in the region. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
The greatest concern is that the current cooperation with 
NATO is seriously undermining Swedish non-alignment. 
Sweden should therefore cut all the NATO-led exercises 
taking place on our soil and airspace. Sweden must also 






Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Lotta Johnsson Fornarve, Left Party 
Motivation 
Left Party acknowledges that international cooperation in 
general enhances international security. However, Swedish 
non-alignment is threatened by the close cooperation with 
NATO which is the reason why it should not be continued. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Decrease in military 
cooperation with the 
Nordic states 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
Nordic States 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with 
NATO 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden should continue to cooperation with NATO as it has 
been in the recent times, meaning that Sweden should 





Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden has opted for a comprehensive partnership with 
NATO which enjoys the support of the majority of the 
parliament. However, this does not mean that Sweden is 
seeking a membership. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Maintain the current level 
of military cooperation / 
mixed position with the 
US 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Increase in national 
military capabilities 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats 
Motivation 
NATO-option also enables us to concentrate on the 
development of our armed forces. As a part of this NATO-
option, we must fulfil the requirements of what it takes to 
become a member of NATO. This means that Social 
Democrats but also the Alliance parties cannot use our defence 
forces as a milk cow to fund other sectors as it had been for 
decades in the past. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Christian Democrats believe that it is important to increase our 
national military capabilities. Sweden must be capable of 






Appendix 8 (continued) 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats 
Motivation 
Sweden is a country which spends the least on its security 
among the Baltic Sea countries. We should seek to increase 
this to around 2% as many of our friends have and what is also 
considered as a NATO standard. 
 
Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Decrease in national 
military capabilities 





Sweden Debate Code name 
Date: 14.12.2020 
Security policy focus - 
Sweden's defence in 2021-
2025 
Maintain the current level 
of military capabilities / 
mixed position 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Håkan Svenneling, Left Party 
Motivation 
The guiding principle of the country’s foreign and security 
policies is Swedish security. This is achieved by full-
functioning defence forces that can protect the country but 
also contribute to peace in other parts of the world. 
Name and party 
affiliation 
Lotta Johnsson Fornarve, Left Party 
Motivation 
A credible non-aligned Sweden needs credible defence forces 
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